With a Gun Pointed at her Head, What are Delcy Rodríguez’s Options, If Any?
Donald Trump’s
success in wresting concessions from Venezuela’s interim President Delcy
Rodríguez is a clear demonstration of what can be achieved through the barrel
of a gun. Just hours after the military incursion that resulted in the kidnaping
of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores on January
3, Trump boasted “we’re going to run the country” and shortly thereafter called
himself Venezuela’s “acting president.” He has also heaped praise on Rodríguez
for serving both U.S. and Venezuelan interests, explaining "She's
doing a great job because she's working with us.”
It’s not
hard to understand why Rodríguez – whose father was a revolutionary martyr – has
been so compliant. On January 3, just hours after the kidnapping of Maduro and
Flores, Trump publicly threatened then vice-president Rodríguez and other
Chavista leaders with what amounted to decapitation, along with a far larger
military assault. According to Rodríguez,
Rubio by phone gave her and the second-in-command Diosdado Cabello 15 minutes
to acquiesce to Washington’s new terms or face death. As she put it, “the
threats and the blackmail are constant.”
Some critics
of the leftist government question the credibility of Rodríguez’s claim. Her version,
however, makes perfect sense. Trump himself repeatedly made similar threats in
public, though couched in more oblique language. And decapitation is exactly
what Washington subsequently did to much of Iran’s leadership.
Washington’s
toolkit of coercive measures against Rodríguez includes the use of blackmail.
Reuters reported in March that federal prosecutors “put
together possible corruption and money laundering charges, and have
communicated to Rodríguez that she is at risk of prosecution unless she
continues to comply with Trump’s demands.” The prosecutors’ money-laundering allegation
in the Venezuelan oil industry is a code word for circumventing U.S.-imposed
sanctions.
Trump touts
the benefits the United States derives from the neocolonial relationship he has
established with Venezuela. On August 28, he announced the reaching of “the biggest
oil deal in world history” which gives the U.S. priority treatment for the sale
of 65 billion barrels of proven reserves in their entirety, greater than those
in the U.S. Other generous aspects of the deal include 20 percent of the oil
production to be purchased at cost by the State Department and the Pentagon’s
35 percent ownership of the operating company.
The threat
of military force is only part of the explanation for Rodríguez’s willingness
to accept the deal. The devastating toll that a decade of severe U.S.-imposed sanctions
has taken on Venezuela’s state-run basic industries such as oil, gas,
electricity, and telecommunications has to be brought into the picture. The sanctions
impaired the ability of the state oil company PDVSA to maintain, repair,
replace and operate equipment, as has been recognized by the U.S. congress’ Congressional Research
Service and nonpartisan
research organizations.
In the
latter years of his rule, Maduro acknowledged the deterioration and turned
increasingly to private capital. Among those who benefited was Alejandro
Betancourt who, unlike Venezuela’s traditional bourgeoisie, had developed close
ties with the Chavista government. The new 65-billion-barrel deal under
Rodríguez designates Betancourt as the key operator and in doing so recognizes
that he is better positioned to attract vast sums of foreign capital than a
highly deteriorated PDVSA. The system of sanctions intimidated everyone
involved in Venezuela’s oil industry, forcing operations into secrecy and
creating fertile ground for corruption. Betancourt himself was accused of illicit
dealings. Despite these charges, Chavista leaders prefer dealing with businesspeople
like Betancourt, rather than the traditional elite that spearheaded several
attempts to topple Chávez. Most of the blame for the corruption rests with
Washington.
For all
Trump’s warm words about Rodríguez, the sanctions that have inflicted such
damage on the Venezuelan economy remain in place. Trump has only selectively
loosened them by issuing individual “licenses” in order to favor U.S. capital.
Navigating
or Selling Out?
On several
occasions, pressure and threats from Washington forced Rodríguez to swallow her
nationalistic pride as a longtime leftist. One was Venezuela’s cooperation with
the U.S. Southern Command in carrying out the air strike in June that killed
Niño Guerrero, the top leader of the notorious gang Tren de Aragua. Compare
that with Mexican president Claudia Sheinbaum’s repeated refusal to accept
joint military operations on Mexican territory against drug cartels.
In addition,
following Venezuela’s highly destructive dual earthquakes on June 24, Rodríguez
met with an Israeli delegation that included military officers at the
presidential palace and praised Israel’s role in the relief efforts. Chavista
demonstrators protested the U.S. and Israeli military presence following the
earthquake with the slogan “This Isn’t Aid,
It’s Occupation.” President Chávez had broken relations with Israel in 2009.
The problem,
of course, isn’t just foreign policy. The Rodríguez government has reformed
Chávez’s flagship legislation the Organic Hydrocarbon Law (LOH), which had set
off the abortive coup against him in April 2002. Rodríguez’s reform, which
modified the LOH in fundamental ways, set the stage for Trump’s “biggest oil
deal in history.”
In the early
months of Rodríguez’s presidency, some on the left credited her ability to
navigate such a precarious situation. Former Italian Red Brigades militant
Geraldina Colotti
called it “an act of political maturity in a context of unprecedented
blackmail.” Now, however, her deference to Washington has divided the U.S.
left, as it has in Venezuela.
Those who support
the Rodríguez government run the risk of ultimately being viewed as lending
support for an imperial project. Defending Trump’s “biggest oil deal in
history” is particularly uncomfortable because leaders on the other side of the
political spectrum are denouncing its lack of transparency. Amazingly,
economist Ricardo Hausmann, one of the main architects of Venezuela’s
neoliberal project of the 1990s, calls the deal “the
most imperialistic thing the U.S. has ever done in its history.”
Particularly
worrisome is the prospect that the Trump administration abruptly changes course
and opts for regime change, before Rodríguez’s strategy for economic recovery
gets off the ground. Such a shift from transactional pragmatism – it’s all
about the oil – to rabid anti-communism is in line with the position championed
by Marco Rubio and other right-wing hawks. The break with Rodríguez is
predictable, though not the timing.
Thinking
Strategically
Progressive
activists have to place Trump’s imposition of the notorious Monroe Doctrine –
now the Donroe Doctrine – at the forefront of all solidarity work. The pro-Venezuela
and pro-Cuba solidarity movements have shown that the most committed activists
are those who to varying degrees sympathize with those governments not the ones
who demonize them.
It’s easy to
say that Rodríguez, her brother Jorge, Cabello and the other top Chavista
leaders should simply say no to Trump and walk away rather than negotiate in
such an unequal relationship. That’s what some on the left advocate. But is abandoning
power or inviting military retaliation at this moment an option?
Juan Carlos
Monedero, a former leader of Spain’s Podemos party and advisor to Chávez, told
me: “The Chavista leadership under Delcy should consider abandoning power since
the relationship with Washington is just too asymmetrical. The Sandinistas did
that in 1990 and then returned.”
Relinquishing
power, however, would mean turning it over to the extreme right led by María
Corina Machado, who has many powerful supporters in Washington. If you go back
to the 48 hours during the 2002 coup when the right-wing opposition
unleashed repression against the Chavistas – with dozens killed – or if you examine
Machado’s vindictive rhetoric over the years you will know what is in store for
the Chavistas and the social movements if she reaches power: repression
Pinochet style. In addition, her slogan “popular capitalism” – which she
borrowed from Margaret Thatcher and Pinochet – underscores the extreme
neoliberal policies that she embraces. The burden is on those on the left who
demonize Rodríguez to explain what realistic strategy they advocate.
Moreover, a
Machado government would add to the growing number of far-right, pro-Trump
governments belonging to the “Shield of the Americas,” an alliance committed to
militarization under the banner of combating drugs, but with the real aim of
driving China from the region. At the founding summit of the Shield in Doral,
Florida in March, Trump reportedly phoned Machado, put the call on speaker, and
told her “Everybody
loves you here.”
Chávez,
Maduro and Rodríguez have drawn inspiration from the example of China. During
one of her many official visits to China in 2025, Vice-President Rodríguez
praised the Chinese economic model as “an
example of dignity, resilience and economic growth.” A guiding principle of
China’s foreign policy, dating from Mao’s death in 1976, was Deng Xiaoping’s
dictum “hide your strength, bide your time.” The phrase basically means that
when the correlation of forces is unfavorable, don’t antagonize or alarm your
enemy. This is precisely what Rodríguez is doing. Objective conditions in
Venezuela – the result of a veritable war
waged from Washington – and subjective conditions – the resultant erosion of
enthusiasm even among the Chavistas – are highly unfavorable. The strategy may
invite criticism given the obvious differences between Communist China and
capitalist Venezuela, but it is hardly far-fetched – and even less so
counterrevolutionary.
Rodríguez’s
pragmatic strategy is in line with the general mood of the country – cutting
across the political spectrum. Venezuelans as a whole are exhausted from the
devastating effects of Washington’s war on Venezuela which played a central role
in driving the average workers’ income down by roughly 80 percent since the
mid-2010s. The call by Machado’s followers grouped in the Vente Venezuela party
for mass protests against Rodríguez has not materialized.
Agree to Disagree
One searches
history in vain for a close parallel to what is unfolding in Venezuela.
Consider: an imperial power kidnaps a country’s president, then reaches
agreements and establishes friendly relations with his vice-president who
remains committed to the ideals of the movement they both represent. For
Rodríguez, the uniqueness presents a formidable challenge.
The Left must
also recognize that, more than is usually the case, crucial pieces of the
puzzle remain unclear. Most important, nothing is known about the negotiations
between the Rodríguez government and the Trump administration. Time
reports that “Rubio and Rodríguez are in nearly daily contact through phone
calls and WhatsApp messages,” but without revealing the details. The key
question is just how far Rodríguez can go in defending Venezuelan interests without
triggering a turnaround on the part of the all-too-erratic Trump. At what point
will Trump go from his transactional, pragmatic mode to his anti-Communist mode
and promote regime change in Venezuela?
Critics of
the Rodríguez government are right to warn that alliances with sectors of the
bourgeoisie, as represented by Alejandro Betancourt, could open a Pandora’s box
which ends up corrupting the broader project of change. But drawing clear lines
between friends and foes from within may have to wait for better times, when
real options are on the table.
Meanwhile, the
solidarity movement needs to remain united, even with diametrically opposed
viewpoints on the Rodríguez government. The starting point has to be an
acknowledgment of the uniqueness of the moment and of how much remains unknown.
Most important, the movement needs to stay focused on combating the atrocities
committed by Washington: the liberation of Maduro and Flores, the lifting of
all sanctions and the return of billions of dollars of Venezuelan assets seized
abroad at the behest of Washington. There should be no doubt that the blame for
Venezuela’s dire situation both before and after January 3 lies squarely with
Washington.
CounterPunch https://www.counterpunch.org/2026/09/11/delcy-rodriguez-has-a-gun-pointed-at-her-head-does-she-have-options/

