Sunday, January 31, 2021

Campaign to Pressure Biden to Lift the International Sanctions against Venezuela, Cuba and Iran

International sanctions imposed by Washington have always been a failure from all viewpoints including the mass suffering that they cause. But under Trump they became especially cruel. Even Saddam was "allowed" to sell oil to pay for food and medicine imports. In contrast Trump actually tightened the sanctions in the midst of the Covid epidemic. In this video, four members of Code Pink tell the story.

https://www.codepink.org/covidsanctions?utm_campaign=no_more_killer_sanct&utm_medium=email&utm_source=codepink&fbclid=IwAR1b1fA_AVOL8kXK4wruPK6vS6cwUjKPjvnGdRnrcMNnK8e6MSXmWs-HZcA

 

Monday, January 25, 2021

Biden’s Venezuela Policy: Zero Learning Curve

Washington’s policy toward Venezuela is unlikely to change under Biden and his Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Biden will continue to recognize Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s president even though he has become completely discredited and isolated in Venezuela, and in fact is now nothing more than an on-line president. David Swanson of The Nation Radio interviewed me today on the topic:  https://soundcloud.com/davidcnswanson/talk-nation-radio-steve-ellner-on-ongoing-us-efforts-to-overthrow-venezuelan-government

 

Thursday, January 21, 2021

Biden’s Continuing Trump’s Targeting of Venezuela

Posted by the Institute for Public Accuracy (Accuracy.org)

January 21, 2021

by Steve Ellner

It is obvious that Biden’s foreign policy team has learned nothing from the disastrous results of Trump’s initiatives toward Venezuela. In a nutshell: regime change cannot be the starting point in any Venezuela policy. The Biden people claim that their plans to enlist the support of allies is an innovation in that it corrects Trump’s go-it-alone approach toward Venezuela. In fact, Trump did seek and attain the support of over 50 nations (hardly a majority in the UN’s General Assembly) by taking advantage of the fact that much of Europe and Latin America was in the hands of conservative and right-wing leaders.

In addition, future Secretary of State Antony Blinken announces that the Biden administration will provide Venezuela with much-needed humanitarian assistance. The Trump administration, however, also extended Venezuela humanitarian aid. But it was channeled through the parallel government of Juan Guaidó resulting in multiple denunciations of misuse of funds – not to say blatant acts of corruption – by members of his team who resigned in protest. 

Blinken also claims Biden will embark on a new course in that it will “more effectively target” sanctions. Exactly what this means is unclear, but decades of the use of sanctions throughout the world demonstrate that, regardless of intent, the real victims of sanctions are the entire population. Even the Trump administration announced that the supply of medicine and food would not be affected but in fact it was. Everyone in the global commercial chain feared reprisals if they had any interaction at all with Venezuelan companies, both private and state-owned.

Far from regime change, the starting point of U.S. policy toward Venezuela has to be recognizing Nicolás Maduro as the nation’s legitimate president. There may have been some irregularities in the Venezuelan presidential elections of 2018, as there have been in U.S. electoral contests, but there was no credible evidence of the votes not getting counted correctly, that is, electoral fraud. The commercial media’s uncritical employment of the term “authoritarian” and “dictator” to refer to Maduro is nothing short of deceptive and it ignores context, namely the multiple violent attempts to remove him, even physically.

Maduro has clearly indicated his interest in negotiations with the U.S. and of late has expressed willingness to make concessions specifically regarding the release of several jailed U.S. citizens. He has also recently indicated his openness to concessions on the economic front. These topics have to be the nuts and bolts of negotiations, not U.S. sponsored regime change which is doomed to failure. 

 

Moderate leftists may get a lot of things right, but on foreign policy they tend to ignore the issues

 

I was disappointed by today’s Democracy Now program on where things stand with Biden in which a spokesperson for Justice Democrats was interviewed. Everyone was upbeat as a result of Biden’s 15 Day-One executive orders, including suspending work on the Keystone Pipeline, reinstalling the Dream Act and rejoining the Paris Climate Agreement. I agree that Biden is off to a good start on the domestic front. But what I found disturbing is that all this hope was expressed and yet during the entire Democracy Now program, not a word was said about foreign policy, about the deadly sanctions against Venezuela, Cuba and Iran, not a word about the 700 military bases that the U.S. has around the world (excluding those at home), and not a word about by far the longest war in U.S. history, that of Afghanistan. Juan Gonzalez made a remark regarding President Lyndon B. Johnson. He said that he (Gonzalez) came of political age in the 1960s (as did I) and that there wasn’t any hope for Johnson and yet he came through with progressive legislation in the framework of the Great Society. I agree with him on that score. Johnson compared much more favorably to Clinton and Obama on that front. But surprisingly Gonzalez said nothing about the war in Vietnam, nor Johnson’s deployment of 30,000 troops to Santo Domingo in 1965 nor the U.S. supported 1964 coup in Brazil also with bloody consequences. So when progressive commentators say that Biden is off to a good start, they’re talking about only 50% of the story (in fact, I believe less than 50%). The other part is foreign policy which progressives need to stay focused on (just as the New Left did in the 60s). And just from a pragmatic viewpoint (let alone all the suffering the U.S. is causing throughout the world), if we don’t achieve world peace it is unlikely that we are going to reduce our military budget and if that happens, even with legislation taxing the rich, there just won’t be enough money to finance the social programs that us progressives embrace.


Sunday, January 10, 2021

Marxism is more than just a tool for analyzing the present. But it's not an all-inclusive blueprint for the future

Book review of Robert Ware’s Marx on Emancipation & Socialist Goals: Retrieving Marx for the Future  published by Palgrave Macmillan, 2019

 

Published in Science and Society, October 2020

 

One of Ware’s overriding arguments is that Marx (more than Engels and Lenin) was reluctant to draw up a blueprint for future developments and specifically for the communist society he saw as feasible in the current stage. For Marx “the future should not be laid out for others – those who will live it” (133). Thus, for instance, Marx contemplated “many phases” following capitalism “but leaves the vast expanse before [the achievement of communism] and afterwards open and undetermined” (189). Along these lines, Ware notes that Marx rejected the idealism of the utopian socialists and Hegel and only “coquetted” (a word used throughout the book as well as in the title of a chapter) with the dialectic. Ware notes that in Capital with a “sprinkling of ‘contradictions’ and ‘crises” here and there… Marx does not appear to be tied to dialectics” as most of the explanation and elaboration of the concept “was left to Engels” (41-42). In keeping with what Ware claims was Marx’s view, the author states that it is appropriate “to think of dialectics as preconceptions and ways of thinking for approaching phenomena rather than laws or rules that determine phenomena,” that is, the concept is “open-ended” (55).

By downplaying Marx’s adherence to the dialectic, Ware fails to distinguish between the idealistic content of Hegelian dialectics and Marx’s version of the concept. This is hardly a minor shortcoming. The elder Marx may not have made frequent reference to the dialectic as did Engels, but he clearly argued that all societies have been subject to internal contradictions (thesis-antithesis) that eventually express themselves in the form of head-on class confrontation and then systemic change. The alternative to this dynamic for those who purport to favor radical change, and even Marxism, is positivism with its evolutionary and deterministic assumptions, (such as in the case of technological determinists like the analytical Marxist G.A. Cohen, who Ware frequently refers to and expresses admiration for). In contrast, the dialectic, which was at the center of Marx’s view of history and society, not only envisions ongoing and inevitable conflict but also complexity given the multiplicity of internal contradictions at any given moment.  

Ware’s discussion of historical materialism is in line with his view of the dialectic as “open-ended.” Ware quotes Marx and Engels in The German Ideology as saying that abstractions about historical processes “‘by no means afford a recipe or schema, as does philosophy, for neatly trimming the epochs of history’” (66) and that (in the words of Marx) “every historical period has laws of its own” (74). Ware claims that for Marx socialism per se was not a “science” even though as a movement socialism “depended on scientific studies” (28).  One may infer that for Ware, Marxism is a tool of analysis, but one that leads to certain self-evident truths. If it did not, Marxism would be nothing more than a methodology and not stand for socialism, communism, internationalism or any number of other concepts.

On issue after issue, Ware rejects what he considers to be quixotic and romantic as well as sectarian interpretations (such as “numerous narrow interpretations”– p. 128 – based on economism) of Marx’s writings. Along these lines, Ware denies that Marx advocated the routine rotation of labor at the workplace. Despite Marx’s polemics with the utopian socialists, he is often accused of being “a utopian with the unrealizable and naïve ideal of modern industry without a division of labour” (80). Even though Marx expressed “interest in diversity of development and variety of talent” (91) he stopped short of systematically applying these goals to the labor force. Ware also minimizes the importance of class consciousness on Marx’s thinking, the use of the term “class for itself” notwithstanding. In his discussion of the issue of class consciousness, Ware warns against the tendency to “saddle him [Marx] with unwanted Hegelian views” (103). More important than class consciousness for Marx was class unity and organization, especially in the form of the trade union movement.   

Ware argues that Marx’s view of nationalism was consistent with his appreciation of the “heterogeneity of human life” (135). Ware rejects the notion that internationalism and nationalism are incompatible, if not diametrically opposed, and that ipso facto Marx spurned the latter. According to Ware, “the claim that workers have no country is so often used, frequently in a misleading way” (116) by, among others, Lenin who stated “‘Marxism cannot be reconciled with nationalism’” (123). (It should be noted, however, that Lenin viewed nationalism among oppressed people as a positive force.) Ware concludes: “nationalism which acknowledges a diversity of nations does not have to be the embarrassment [for the left] that it has often been take to be” (135).

Marx, according to Ware, envisioned the achievement of socialism as essentially a humanistic process. In the first place, he did not discard the possibility of overthrowing the bourgeoisie in some countries by “peaceful means” (133) and never offered “any reason for initiating violence” (164). In the second place, Marx never wavered in his commitment to democracy. Ware adheres to the interpretation of the use of the term “dictatorship of the proletariat” put forward by Hal Draper according to which Marx’s intention was largely to refute “those socialists who wanted a dictatorship of a small group or vanguard to lead the proletariat” (162).

Ware’s discussion of democracy leads him to contrast Marx’s thinking with that of Lenin. While Marx envisioned the state in the transition to communism as the “rule by the proletariat,” Lenin “had the sense of the state acting for the proletariat in dictatorial ways” (191). Ware, however, fails to define the term “dictatorial ways,” nor does he distinguish Lenin’s thoughts on the subject between before and after the Soviet revolution of 1917. In general, Ware fails to bring into his analysis the formidable challenges including the use of violence that all revolutionary processes have faced throughout history from the old ruling class, and which Marx and Engels were acutely aware of. Lenin’s response to the repressive side of the ruling class was his thesis of “democratic centralism,” namely that the tactics and strategy employed by the revolutionary movement depend on the existing political climate. In other words, extreme centralism at the expense of grassroots participation may be necessary depending on circumstances. Ware omits any reference to these historical realities from a book that is otherwise a cohesive and well-argued interpretation of the writings of the father of communism.

Steve Ellner



 

Trump got one thing right: There is a “deep state” – The lessons of January 6

 

The most striking “lesson” of the events of January 6 is the extent to which Trump has gotten one thing right: the existence of a “deep state,” though it certainly doesn’t consist of a bunch of pedophiles. It’s really amazing how predictable the events were (something that the mainstream media hasn’t emphasized enough) and that in fact January 6 was not more of a bloody affair than it was. After all, the head of the Proud Boys was giving instruction to his base to smuggle arms into the protest, something that the media reported on at the time. January 6 demonstrated how the deep state – called “power centers,” by Poulantzas, among others – works in situations of crisis. Parts of the deep state (or power centers) provide active support for the fascists, and parts play the role of accomplices. What happened on January 6 recalls the German state’s acceptance of Hitler’s request for citizenship just two years before he was elected chancellor in 1933. By then, everyone knew what Hitler represented and the stakes involved. The state bureaucracy is hardly neutral, but is not homogenous either as Poulantzas describes in his later works on the state as a social relation.


Saturday, January 9, 2021

Los Acontecimientos del 6 de Enero en Washington Arrojan Luz sobre el “Deep State”

 

Telesur me entrevistó el día 6 de enero sobre los acontecimientos ocurridos ese día en Washington. Lo que pasó ese día es una clara indicación del apoyo que tiene Trump en los centros de poder (lo que él llama el “deep state”). Todo lo que ocurrió estaba perfectamente previsible y sin embargo los cuerpos de seguridad no reaccionó en forma adecuada. Por cierto, algunos de sus miembros colaboraron con los insurrectos. Una comparación puede hacerse con el Estado alemán de la República de Weimar que dos años antes de que Hitler fue elegido canciller en 1933 logró nacionalizarse a pesar de que todo el mundo sabía para esa fecha el peligro que él representaba. La lección: la burocracia estatal, lejos de ser neutral, está claramente alineada con las fuerzas del status quo y de la reacción.

https://youtu.be/jkfO4Oxv_Es