Wednesday, October 28, 2020

CENTER-LEFT CONVERGENCE IN VENEZUELA: A BLOW TO U.S. INTERVENTION

Jacobin, October 27, 2020

by Steve Ellner

Like other Venezuelan centrists, Claudio Fermín – a protege of neoliberal president Carlos Andrés Pérez in the early 1990s – has changed course and now vehemently opposes both US interventionism and his nation’s radical right. His changes show just how much Venezuelan politics have been transformed over the recent past. Since the attempted coup of April 2002, leftist governments have been pitted against a united opposition intent on achieving regime change by any means possible. But now such extreme polarization seems to be weakening.

A former mayor of Caracas and presidential candidate, Fermín is not alone among centrist politicians in bucking the Trump administration, which insists on a boycott of the upcoming National Assembly elections for the purpose of further isolating president Nicolás Maduro. 

Fermín’s nationalistic rhetoric was on display in a recent interview in which he lashed out at both the Venezuelan right and the Trump administration and other governments that have followed its lead: “The superpowers have buddied up with the nation's anti-Venezuelan political elite, who don’t really have Venezuela in their hearts, who impede the arrival of oil tankers with much needed gasoline… The sanctions are a negation of national sovereignty.” Washington’s implementation of international sanctions — opposed by dissidents within opposition ranks —has greatly contributed to this shake-up of Venezuelan politics.  

Even in recent years, the opposition had been united. In the 2015 elections for the National Assembly, it achieved an all-encompassing unity, supporting a single anti-government ticket that emerged victorious. Then, in January 2019, the entire opposition went along with Juan Guaidó’s self-proclamation as president. But now the centrists, who for the most part recognize the legitimacy of the nation’s political system, are faced off against politicians on the Right who are calling for abstention in the National Assembly elections slated for December 6.

The convergence between center and left is not only the result of Washington's policies and the untold suffering they have inflicted on the Venezuelan people. It is also the product of president Nicolás Maduro's adroit strategy of accepting some of the demands of the centrists while pursuing a hardline approach against the insurgent opposition. Carlos Ron, vice-minister for North America, told me “Maduro has to be recognized for achieving what appeared impossible: moving a big chunk of the opposition from insurgency to peace.”

But the strategy has downsides. Concessions to business interests, which go hand in hand with Maduro's conciliatory strategy, have been criticized by a left faction of the governing Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV). In addition, the Communist Party and several other parties and groups belonging to the ruling Polo Patriótico alliance have broken with Maduro and formed a rival slate for the upcoming elections.

And despite their recent stands, it is clear that the centrists are far from stable allies for Maduro. Some are just biding their time — waiting for the right moment to attempt to force him out through a recall election.

Stiffening the Sanctions            

As the Trump administration rachets up the sanctions and threats of military action, Venezuelans increasingly reject them. The public opinion firm Hinterlaces released a poll in November 2017 indicating that 72 percent of Venezuelans oppose the sanctions, and another in August 2020 showing that the figure had increased to 81 percent. According to this latter survey, 80 percent of Venezuelans say that the “role of the United States has been negative.”

Trump’s stiffening of the sanctions in the age of COVID-19 is a premier example of what Naomi Klein calls the “Shock Doctrine”: situations of crisis and suffering provide the powerful with unique opportunities to impose dramatic changes.

In the midst of the coronavirus, the Trump administration has ordered four oil service companies to close operations in Venezuela. It is also rescinding similar special “permissions” that had been granted to Spain’s Repsol, Italy’s ENI, and India’s Reliance Industries to engage in swap arrangements involving oil, as long as no cash was involved. The termination of these barter deals will deprive Venezuela of diesel fuel used to transport food and generate electricity.

The sanctions against individual Venezuelans have also taken a disturbing turn in recent months. Previously, the targets were Venezuelan politicians, bureaucrats and others associated with the government who were accused of engaging in illicit acts, such as corruption, repression and drug trafficking. But now, in 2020, even political centrists are in the crosshairs of the Trump administration, because of their insufficient enthusiasm for Guaidó.

In January, the Department of the Treasury sanctioned seven dissident members of the opposition’s main political parties – Acción Democrática (AD), COPEI, Primero Justicia and Voluntad Popular – who had begun to question their organizations’ unconditional support for Guaidó and opposition to electoral participation. The Trump administration took at face value the word of pro-Guaidó leaders that the dissidents were engaged in corrupt dealings involving a government food distribution program. In fact, the sanctions were politically motivated, as revealed by James Story, US ambassador to Venezuela, when he warned “those who undermine Venezuelan democracy will be sanctioned.”

In September, Steven Mnuchin and the Treasury Department made it even clearer that the sanctions were all about politics. The heads of five break-off parties including AD’s Bernabé Gutiérrez, a well-respected long-time party leader, were placed on the sanction list. In doing so, Treasury accused these “key figures” of carrying out a plan “to place the opposition parties in the lap of politicians affiliated with the regime of Nicolas Maduro”

In adopting punitive measures, the Trump administration is taking sides in an internal party matter of tactics. Indeed, the dispute within different parties of the opposition, particularly AD and Primera Justicia, over electoral participation versus abstention dates back many years. Gutiérrez questioned his party’s refusal to run candidates in the National Assembly elections of 2005, when Claudio Fermín was expelled from AD for advocating participation.

How Marginal are the Centrists?

Parties on both sides of the political spectrum have split in the leadup to the December elections. In the case of AD, COPEI, Primero Justicia and Voluntad Popular, the PSUV-dominated Supreme Tribunal of Justice has recognized the legality of the parties participating in the electoral contest, and not the abstentionist ones.

The Trump administration has labeled the non-abstentionistists “marginal politicians.” If the presidential elections of 2018 are any indication, abstention will be just slightly over 50 per cent. Naturally, that does not mean that all those who abstain are thereby supporting Guaidó and his allies. 

Much is at stake in the battle between the abstentionists and non-abstentionists. The emergence of a bloc of non-leftist parties that either explicitly or tacitly recognize the legitimacy of Venezuela’s political system could pave the way for a new era in the country's politics devoid of the internecine warfare of the past. Furthermore, it is a clear demonstration of the bankruptcy of the Trump administration’s regime change efforts. And it puts the lie to the claim of both Democratic and Republican leaders that Maduro is nothing less than a dictator. 

Fermín argues that opposition party militants are at cross purposes with their leaders. “Thousands of activists have been denied the possibility of running for city council or for mayor. Abstentionism has castrated a whole generation of activists since 2005.”

Gutíerrez claims that in January AD’s state-level secretary-generals held rank-and-file assemblies at the local level and “everyone expressed support for electoral participation.” Subsequently, however, national secretary-general Henry Ramos imposed his will on the party in favor of abstentionism.

Fermín and Gutiérrez may be overly optimistic regarding their projections for the turnout on December 6. The nation's harsh economic conditions, in contrast to its previous status as a privileged, oil-producing nation, influence many Venezuelans to doubt the legitimacy of the existing system. Furthermore, the sway of opposition parties that favor abstention cannot be overestimated.

Not only AD but also two-time presidential candidate Henrique Capriles of Primero Justicia had been open to electoral participation early this year but then swung over to the abstentionist camp. Undoubtedly pressure from abroad including fear of US sanctions does much to explain their reconsideration.

Indeed, the international setting is a key variable. Most of the governments in the Americas and Europe are in the hands of right-wing and conservative parties and have played an activist role in favor of Venezuelan regime change. The Venezuelan centrists hoped for backing from Europe, particularly Spain's moderate government which at one point sent out mixed signals. But much to the disappointment of the centrists, in September the European Union rejected Maduro’s invitation for it to provide electoral observers in December,

Maduro's Gambit

The Maduro government and the centrists have supported each other in concrete ways. In January, the centrists requested and received legal recognition from the Supreme Tribunal of Justice for the National Assembly they controlled, as opposed to a parallel body controlled by Guaidó's followers. Then the same court recognized the centrist-controlled parties which had split off from the ones headed by traditional opposition leaders. In turn, the centrists have explicitly or tacitly rejected the Right's characterization of the Maduro government as a narco-terrorist dictatorship.

Indeed, the centrists' willingness to defy international and domestic pressure is predicated on three assertions: first, the Maduro government is not a narco-state, second, it is not a dictatorship and third, it has over the recent past adopted business-friendly policies.

If convincing evidence were to disprove any of these statements, the strategy followed by the centrists would be untenable.

Maduro’s pro-business reforms were welcomed by centrists — but brought criticism from some on the Left including close supporters. The latest example of the government’s opening to the private sector is the recently passed "Anti-Blockade Law" which would allow the executive to enter into secret agreements with private capital over new property arrangements – possibly containing “clauses to protect investment in order to generate confidence and stability.”

The Communist Party slammed the arrangement as a reversal of Hugo Chávez’s policies in favor of national independence and an attempt to legalize a “policy of subordination to the interests of capital.”

Fermín was more receptive to the proposal and praised Maduro for not expropriating a single company, which he claimed amounted to a “self-criticism” with regard to the policies of his predecessor.  

The second assertion – which debunks the narco-state thesis – denies the existence of the drug-trafficking "Cartel de los Soles," which Washington has been claiming is operated by the Venezuelan heads of state ever since Chávez was elected in 1998 and is now led by Maduro. Coincidentally, the US Justice Department waited until this March to introduce an indictment in federal court in Manhattan the same day the Trump administration put a 15 million-dollar bounty on Maduro.

Fulton Armstrong, with decades of experience working for US intelligence, has said "No serious analyst I know outside of the government would say there is a Cartel de los Soles.”

The third claim — that of dictatorial rule — is equally far-fetched but calls into question Maduro's hard line against adversaries. The decision to recognize centrist-led parties instead of traditional opposition leaders, for instance, appears heavy-handed. Maduro defenders may respond that those leaders have cast themselves so far outside of the law by actively supporting foreign intervention and so many violent, regime-change actions that they have, at least temporarily, forfeited their democratic rights. But this argument cannot be applied to leftist parties such as Patria Para Todos (PPT) and the Tupamaro, which after leaving the governing Polo Patriótico alliance along with the Communist Party also lost their legal recognition to split-off organizations. At the same time, the PSUV’s mayor of Caracas made false accusations regarding the moral conduct of PPT secretary-general José Albornoz.

Government critics point to irregularities and violation of democratic norms, such as the Supreme Tribunal of Justice's recognition of certain political parties and not others. But most critics seldom present concrete plausible evidence of votes not being counted correctly, surely essential to defining the government as a dictatorship. Electoral fraud is frequently conflated with irregularities, as was the case in the two previous presidential elections of 2013 and 2018. Labeling Maduro a “usurper,” as the opposition repeatedly does, is predicated on the assumption that electoral fraud was committed in both elections.

Luis Vicente León, a much-respected pollster and supporter of the opposition, argued that the essence of democracy is a state that provides “the same conditions for all actors, in which the arbitrator should be impartial ... and public resources not be used in favor of anyone.” León is right to say that this golden rule is being violated — though to some extent it always has been, ever since the outset of Venezuelan democracy. 

Carlos Ron points out that at least in one respect the playing field is tilted in favor of the opposition. "The voter knows full well that by reelecting the PUSV, the sanctions stay in place. The minute the opposition returns to power they'll be lifted.” That one factor alone is likely to sway a lot of votes in December.

Steve Ellner, a retired professor at Venezuela's Universidad de Oriente. is an Associate Manager Editor of Latin American Perspectives and editor of the forthcoming book Latin American Extractivism: Dependency, Resource Nationalism and Resistance in Broad Perspective.

https://jacobinmag.com/2020/10/sanctions-venezuela-maduro-guaido-trump?fbclid=IwAR2fBSRZAcU33XcboroWauetlXH1IiWfmyLxoL5hzwalb9ArCGYBhqeurPU

 



Friday, October 23, 2020

Conspiracism in the Age of Neoliberalism

 CONSPIRACY AND CONSPIRACY THEORY IN THE AGE OF TRUMP. Conspiracies do exist, though not of the sort that Alex Jones of Infowars and his ilk talk about. There was a conspiracy, for instance, to assassinate JFK. Capitalist rule on a day by day basis, however, counts on more subtle mechanisms. The issue of conspiracies and conspiracy theory has important implications and has been raised in the debate over Marxist theories on the state, such as in the Miliband-Poulantzas debate. The following is a book review essay of mine  published by Science and Society. It's on the book “Conspiracies and Conspiracy Theory in the Age of Trump” by Daniel Hellinger” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

 

Conspiracism in the Age of Neoliberalism

by Steve Ellner

Published in Science and Society Vol. 84, No. 4, October 2020, 536–545

Outlandish conspiracy theories fabricated by the far right have generated distrust in the federal government per se as well as racism, anti-Semitism and ethnic phobias. At the same time, however, far-right news outlets such as Fox News and Breitbart News use the term as a pejorative to dismiss and mock the denunciations formulated by liberals and leftists regarding the role of big money in politics. The conspiracy theory tag has even been attached (by the New York Times, among others) to books which question the veracity of the Warren Commission report on the Kennedy assassination, despite the fact that a majority in the U.S. agree with their thesis. Within the left, the conspiracy theory label has also been employed, as occurred in the debate over Marxist theories of the state initiated by Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas in the 1970s. The degree to which conspiracy theory is relevant to that debate partly depends on the way the term is defined, as will be discussed in this essay.

In the book under review, Daniel Hellinger points out that conspiracy theories have spiked over the last two decades, not only among right-wing zealots on the margins but rational analysts such as Paul Krugman, who nevertheless deny that their arguments can be characterized as such. Indeed, Hellinger demonstrates that conspiracy theory is more than just right-wing babble. The wider scope that he brings to the discussion of conspiracy theory and conspiratorial actions is facilitated by a broader definition of the phenomenon than what is usually formulated. Whereas most analysts define conspiracy as involving the nefarious, secretive and illegal actions of a relatively small group, Hellinger denies that it excludes legal activity.

In a more general sense, the heightened use of conspiracy theory compels those on the left to examine definitions and make distinctions between “rational skepticism” (such as the questioning of the Warren Report - Runciman, 2016) and irrational thinking consisting of implausible conspiracy theories. Indeed, as one article in Jacobin points out, those who dismiss the “rational skeptics” as conspiracy theorists often “seem as prone to conspiratorial thinking as any adolescent dabbling in memes” (Mills, 2018). In addition to vindicating serious “conspiracy theory,” Hellinger sheds light on Marxist analysis of how capitalism works in the age of globalization, as discussed in the latter half of this article.

 Debunking the Myth of Conspiracy Theory as Tantamount to Paranoia

Richard Hofstadter, in his landmark The Paranoid Style in American Politics published in 1964, traced populist movements throughout U.S. history which he claimed were characterized by irrational behavior and were often underpinned by conspiracy theories. Since then, as Hellinger shows, it is Hofstadter’s assumptions regarding the deviant behavior of conspiracy theorists and their followers that have “most informed students” (45) of the subject. Hellinger reviews numerous subsequent writings that claim conspiracy theory “is for losers” (19) and induces “conspiracy panic” (38-73) and points out that the topic has been meticulously explored “in the subfield of political psychology” (13), which dwells on its pathological nature. Even for much of the left, conspiracy theory is “regarded as a form of ‘false consciousness’ that holds the oppressed class back from seeing the root of their exploitation in capitalism” (3).

Hellinger notes, however, that conspiracy theory is not always irrational. He then asks “If conspiracies exist, why do so many studies devoted to ‘conspiracy theory’ seek to deny their importance as political activities, or sometimes even their existence?” (47). In effect, Hellinger disputes the demonization of conspiracy theory just as Ernesto Laclau argued against the demonization of populism.[1] The pejorative use of both concepts opened the doors for pro-establishment writers to dismiss the seriousness of the arguments of progressive movements, leaders and writers – from Juan Domingo Perón and Hugo Chávez, in the case of populism, to writers exposing the influence of lobbies, in the case of conspiracy theory.   

One of Hellinger’s main observations is that both conspiracy theorizing and “conspiracy”-type activity have soared over the last two decades, along with the pervasiveness of secret operations in the political sphere. He points out that conspiracy theory has been promoted not only by far-right lunatics like Alex Jones, but by members of the elite. Actually, Hofstadter also showed that ruling elites were the instigators of conspiracy theories from the Salem Witch Trials to the McCarthy-era witch hunts, as well as the claims about Bilderberg Group world domination formulated by far-right Republicans who supported the presidential nomination of Barry Goldwater in 1964. Nevertheless, there has been a quantitative leap in conspiracy theorizing over the recent past “across the political spectrum (not just on the right)” (p. 56). Never before has a U.S. president actively promoted conspiracy theories as does Trump, while Democratic Party leaders have indulged in the same, as in the case of Russiagate (Kovalik, 2017).   

As part of his broad focus on conspiracy theory and conspiratorial activity, Hellinger discusses in the chapter “Dark Money and Trumpism,” the “complicated networks” (p. 186) that facilitate the anonymous campaign contributions of powerful economic interests. For Hellinger, the “deliberate secretive nature” (p. 195) of this money flow is a key component of conspiratorial activity. He adds that the efforts to maintain the secrecy is sometimes overlooked (see also Mayer, 2016, 281, 305-311).[2] The Koch brothers, for instance, “have gone to great lengths to hide this [type of] operation, to misrepresent it as philanthropy” (215). Another reason why surreptitious activity along these lines is conspiratorial is that it is part “a long-term strategy to impact educational and cultural institutions” (186) as well as the nation’s Supreme Court.

Whether legal activity can be considered conspiratorial lies at the center of Hellinger’s attempt to redefine the phenomenon.[3] Hellinger makes reference to well-documented evidence of conspiracies of an illegal nature that right wingers and centrists brushed off as “conspiracy theory.” One of his examples is the role of the Nicaraguan Contras and the CIA in introducing crack cocaine in Los Angeles (Webb, 1998) that the establishment media dismissed, at least initially, as conspiracy theory. Unlike this case, it is not always clear whether dark money in politics, which Hellinger also labels conspiratorial, is legal, semi-legal or illegal. For Hellinger, the Koch brothers’ injection of hundreds of millions of dollars into politics is conspiratorial but “thanks to Citizens United, their political activity is not illegal, [even though]… it is deceptive and unethical” (195) and has a “sinister,  corrupting impact on democracy” (186).

Conspiracy Theory: Instrumentalism and Structural Marxism

Hellinger relates the increased prominence of conspiracy theory to “the global rise of neoliberal capitalism” (24) and “serious problems with liberal democracy” (26). He argues that conspiracy theories are nurtured by the tensions generated by globalization, specifically by “demands that the United States act in the interest of the global capitalism, not in defense… of the national economic interests” (148). Hellinger fails, however, to elaborate on the relationship between neoliberalism and increased acceptance of conspiracy theories. Examination of the relationship between the neoliberal model of capitalism (the structure) and conspiracy theory (“superstructure”) provides an insight into the issue. As David Harvey (2005, 70-86) points out, neoliberalism in recent decades has taken on the form of a political project based, not so much on laissez faire economics, as on the tightening of links between powerful business groups and policy makers, particularly in the area of economic decision making. The increasingly cozy relationship between government and business groups, sometimes referred to as “crony capitalism,” impacts people’s thinking.[4] Crony capitalism breeds distrust toward the state, and with it an unbending belief in conspiracy-type theories among people across the political spectrum, though it is most visible on the far right.

Hellinger’s arguments that conspiracy theory has become increasingly relevant in recent decades and that the use of the term as a pejorative is intentionally deceptive raise important issues related to the instrumentalist theory of the state. Instrumental Marxism and its main proponent Ralph Miliband argued that under capitalism the state’s actions and its very nature were the product of the direct input of the bourgeoisie. Nicos Poulantzas defended a contrasting theory in which the capitalist structure and not the actions of individual capitalists is the determinant factor.[5]

In its emphasis on the tangible links between capitalists and the state, instrumentalism was criticized for being based on personalism (by Poulantzas, among others) and for promoting conspiracy theory (Baltzell, 1969, 412). Detractors of instrumentalism including Marxists accused Miliband’s seminal The State in Capitalist Society (1969) of containing an important element of conspiracy theory (Boyle, 1985, 723n119; Tietze, 2012). Non-Marxist instrumentalists C. Wright Mills, G. and William Domhoff adamantly denied that instrumentalism had anything in common with conspiracy theory (Sigler, 1966, 39; Gillam, 1975, 496; Domhoff, 1990, 69, 187; Mills, 2018).[6] Domhoff critiqued conspiracy theory on grounds that it exaggerated the qualities it assigned to the conspiratorial elite: its homogeneity, competence, utmost secrecy, the success of its operations, and small numbers (Domhoff, 2005; see also Mills, 2018).

The issue of heterogeneity versus homogeneity is at the heart of the discussion over the connection between instrumentalist theory of the state and conspiracy theory. But rather than focus on the “conspiratorial elite” as Domhoff does, it is necessary to look at the ruling class as a whole. Under normal circumstances the bourgeoisie is beset with internal tensions (thus its heterogeneity), as virtually all Marxists recognize. Fractions of the ruling class secretly “conspire” on a regular basis to advance their interests. Instrumentalists, however, unlike right-wing conspiracy theorists, do not believe that these class fractions as such aspire to achieve world domination as part of a grand scheme. 

On the other hand, Miliband’s The State in Capitalist Society demonstrated the cohesiveness and commonality of the capitalist class. In doing so it debunked the notion defended by pluralists like Robert Dahl (1961) that elite factions are in an ongoing state of sharp rivalry and competition with little to unify them, characteristics which are alleged to be the essence of U.S. democracy (Miliband 1969, 44-48). Ruling class cohesiveness is compatible with another form of conspiratorial activity, referred to by one media expert as “high conspiracy,” in which the ruling class and its intellectual servants know what to do in any given situation with no need to receive anything other than occasional tacit instructions (to be discussed below).

As a skeptic of conspiracy theory, Domhoff also minimized the secret nature of groups, such as the Council on Foreign Relations, that have been considered conspiratorial as well as the existence of a “shadow government” (what today is pejoratively called the “deep state”) that carries out illegal actions (Domhoff, 2005). Miliband, for his part, was far less skeptical about conspiracy theory and questioned the empirical basis of arguments that dismiss it (Miliband, 1982, 79-83). In essence, Miliband’s position is in line with one of Hellinger’s central, though implicit, points: For those attempting to counter pro-system writers who cry out conspiracy theory in order to discredit writings that expose the machinations of members of the ruling class, it is more effective to reject the pejorative connotations of the term than to deny its applicability altogether. Indeed, one may ask, what’s wrong with using the word conspire?[7]

Another issue raised by Hellinger that is relevant to the instrumentalist theory of the state is the relationship between conspiracy theory and neoliberalism. Hellinger’s discussion of big money in politics in the form of the Koch brothers’ campaign contributions would appear to be the way the capitalist system has always worked in democratic settings. The new element, however, associated with the age of neoliberalism is that with Citizens United and similar rulings and the emergence of Super PACS, politics has become flooded with dark money, which is anonymous and semi-anonymous but not necessarily illegal. Furthermore, Citizens United along with other developments, such as the weakening of the political influence of the labor movement, take the United States to the border of crony capitalism with its intricate nexus between capitalists and the political elite. These characteristics of U.S. capitalism in the neoliberal age enhance the appeal of conspiracy theory at the same time that they strengthen the cogency of the instrumentalist theory of the state with its emphasis on the direct political input of the capitalist class.

Final Reflections on Conspiracy Theory from a Marxist Perspective

Preposterous conspiracy theories formulated by Alex Jones and other right-wingers involve small numbers of individuals who carry out horrendous actions. The scapegoating of small groups (Jewish bankers, for instance) by conspiracy theorists who put forward a world view serve as substitutes for class analysis and for that reason (and others) is adamantly rejected by Marxists. Conspiracy theories of a more feasible type also envision decisions coming from elite groups but do not view these actions as part of a larger scheme to achieve world domination. 

Explicit commands are largely absent from the dynamic involving the normal reproduction of ideas. Throughout the book, Hellinger refers to Michel Foucault’s concept of the “regime of truth,” which distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable ideas, or “the boundary of acceptable discourse” (32). In what some media experts have called “high conspiracy,” “news agendas are tightly framed by more hidden forces” (Eldridge, 1995, 9) on highly strategic topics, but in most cases there is leeway. Rather than receiving orders of what to do and say from their superiors, journalists, teachers and politicians are instructed what to eschew, sometimes explicitly but usually by inference. Take, for instance, progressive schoolteachers. If they want to keep their job, they have to know the limits of what they can teach. Hints regarding those limits may be conveyed by the school principal – as opposed to the laying out of a particular line that must be articulated. The boundaries between what is acceptable and unacceptable or taboo are constantly changing, often as a result of pressure from popular movements. In addition, there are degrees of unacceptableness.[8] An example is the principled rejection of racism and misogyny which until the 1960s was largely outside the regime of truth in the United States and elsewhere. The boundaries have changed as Hollywood and TV networks now produce thousands of movies and shows about the injustices against women and African Americans in the present and throughout history. In contrast, little is said about the victims of McCarthyism and other forms of anti-communism. In a liberal democracy (unlike in a totalitarian state), “liberty” means, in effect, that the realm of truth is extensive, and that writers and artists have much to explore and choose from.

Marxism, and specifically Gramscian Marxism, provides insights into the political decision-making process, which serve as an alternative to conspiracy theory. The bourgeoisie as a whole is more cohesive and assertive than what is envisioned by conspiracy theory adherents who believe in the dominant role played by small elite groups, such as the Illuminati and the Bilderberg Group. The bourgeoisie’s worldview is molded and reinforced by participation in exclusive social and political spaces and interactions ranging from forums to social clubs, as examined in much literature going back to C. Wright Mill’s The Power Elite. This common set of class beliefs obviates the need for explicit instructions to come from above, even while at times signals originate from diverse elite-dominated sources that tacitly indicate a given political line and slogans to follow. The distinction between this position and that of conspiracy theory is illustrated by the controversy around the influence of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) on the formulation of U.S. foreign policy toward Israel. While conspiracy theory would allege that AIPAC dictates U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, a Marxist view would point out that AIPAC’s positions largely coincide with those of more powerful interests, such as the oil and arms industries, along with the ruling class in general.[9]

The discussion of conspiracy theory also helps frame issues regarding the political behavior of the middle class (or the petty bourgeoisie, as opposed to the working class). A simplistic conspiracy theory take coming from the left would argue that the thinking of the middle class as a whole is the product of the viewpoints put forward by the commercial media which has become highly centralized. In essence, a few people at the top are molding the thinking of the entire population, and the middle class in particular, whose thinking largely coincides with that of the bourgeoisie. A Gramscian outlook would provide different explanations and lead to different conclusions. Objective material interests help explain the positions assumed by the middle class, while its fears, anxieties and aspirations are also the result of its relations to the means of production and its location in society. The convictions and prejudices of the middle class would appear to be too ingrained and ardently defended to be passed off as the product of sheer manipulation by the media. The process in which a revolutionary movement achieves hegemony is much more complicated and drawn out than just gaining control of the media and other institutional opinion makers.

Some conspiratorial situations involve small groups acting in secretive and nefarious ways on behalf of the ruling class. Even in these cases, however, the “conspiratorial group” often does not plan an action but rather “lets it happen.” Hellinger claims that it is “highly unlikely” that “the Bush administration allowed or made 9/11 happen” (60). There are, however, degrees of “letting it happen” which Hellinger fails to explore. Top members of the Bush administration evidently had some knowledge that something was being planned but simply failed to prioritize counter-terrorist measures (Clarke, 2004, 243-244, 256) partly due to their belief that a terrorist attack of some nature would be politically beneficial. Other writers have put forward plausible “let it happen” accounts of the role of the secret service in the JFK assassination (Prouty, 1992, 291-94) as well as the role of the police in the assassination of Malcolm X (Marable, 2011; see also Netflix’s “Who Killed Malcolm X”).[10]

In short, Hellinger’s book frames issues which are of great relevance for leftist, and specifically Marxist, analysis in the age of neoliberalism. The right profits from propagating fantasy-like conspiratorial tales which reinforce its worldview, while champions of the status quo use the term conspiracy theory to denigrate those who document the machinations of the ruling elite. For these reasons it is necessary to put forward a well-formulated analysis of both conspiracy theory and conspiratorial activity, and not dismiss the topic as the exclusive preserve of the right.

REFERENCES

 

Amin, Samir. 2019. “The New Imperialist Structure.” Monthly Review 71 (3): 32-45.

Baltzell, E. Digby. 1969. Review of The Rich and the Super-Rich: A Study in the Power of Money Today by Ferdinand Lundberg. American Sociological Review, 34: 3 (June), 411-412.

Berg, Kati Tusinski. 2012. “The Ethics of Lobbying: Testing an Ethical Framework for Advocacy in Public Relations.” Journal of Mass Media Ethics 12: 2 (April-June), 97–114.

Boyle, James. 1985. “The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 133 no. 4 (April): 686-780.  

Chomsky, Noam. 2006. “The Israel Lobby?” ZNET (March 28). https://chomsky.info/20060328/

Clarke, Richard A. 2004. Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror. New York: Free Press.

Dahl, Robert 1961. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Domhoff, William G. 1990. The Power Elite and the State: How Policy is Made in America. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

________.2005. “There are no Conspiracies” (March). http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/10/126.html

Eldridge, John. 1995. “Introduction: That Was the World that was.” Pp. 1-26 in Eldridge (ed.), Glasgow Media Group Reader, Volume 1: News Content, Language and Visuals. London: Routledge.

Ellner, Steve. 2017. “Implications of Marxist State Theory and How They Play Out in Venezuela.” Historical Materialism 25:2, 29-62.

Gillam, Richard. 1975. “C. Wright Mills and the Politics of Truth: The Power Elite Revisited.”  American Quarterly 27: 4 (October), 461-479.

Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kovalik, Dan. 2017. The Plot to Scapegoat Russia: How the CIA and the Deep State Have Conspired to Vilify Russia. New York: Skyhorse Publishing.

Laclau, Ernesto. 2005. On Populist Reason. New York: Verso.

Lundberg, Ferdinand. 1968 The Rich and the Super-Rich: A Study in the Power of Money Today. New York: Lyle Stuart.  

Marable, Manning. 2011. Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention. New York: Viking Press.

Mayer, Jane. 2016. Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right. New York: Anchor Books.

Miliband, Ralph. 1969. The State in Capitalist Society. New York: Basic Books.

_________.1982. Capitalist Democracy in Britain, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mills, Tom. 2018. “Can the Ruling Class Speak?” Jacobin. (October 14). https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/10/ruling-class-elites-conspiracies-antisemitism-marxism

Prouty, L. Fletcher [the inspiration for “Mr. X” in Oliver Stone’s movie JFK]. 1992. JFK: The CIA, Vietnam, and the Plot to Assassinate John F. Kennedy. New York: Carol Publishing Group.

Runciman, David. 2016 “Are Conspiracy Theories Bad for Democracy?” (February 10). Public lecture sponsored by London School of Economics and Political Science. http://www.lse.ac.uk/lse-player?id=3373

Sigler, Jay A. 1966. “The Political Philosophy of C. Wright Mills.” Science & Society 30: 1 (Winter), 32-49.

Tietze, Tad. 2012. “Bourne, Assange and the Politics of Conspiracy” (September 10). Overland: Progressive Culture since 1954. https://overland.org.au/2012/09/bourne-assange-the-politics-of-conspiracy/

Webb, Gary. 1998. Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.



FOOTNOTES

[1] Laclau’s central thesis is that the salient features of populist strategies are both the polarization and head-on confrontations that their rhetoric sets in motion (referred to as the “politics of antagonism”) and the efforts to unite people with distinct interests, values and demands (the “politics of equivalence”). According to Laclau, the politics of equivalence is what politics is all about (Laclau, 2005).

[2] One example of a writer who plays down the secret dimension embodied in conspiracy theory is sociologist William Domhoff , to be discussed below. In addition, pro-system writers who defend the activity of “interest groups” in the form of lobbying, ignore the secrete nature of much of their activity (Berg, 2012, 111-13).

[3] Hellinger discusses various features of conspiracies and adds that they are “illegal…or unethical” (23).

[4] Samir Amin (2019: 34) points out that application of the term “crony capitalism” should not be reserved to South East Asia and Latin America as it also characterizes the economy of the U.S. and Europe. He adds “in its current behavior this ruling class is quite close to that of the mafia.”

[5] Elsewhere, I have argued that the two Marxist schools of thinking on the state are not incompatible and that the term “in the last instance” to refer to the exclusively fundamental role played by one of the two dynamics (instrumentalist or structural) is misleading (Ellner, 2017, 57-58; for a different version of the article see https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/13386).

[6] Another non-Marxist instrumentalist, Ferdinand Lundberg, also rejected the idea of “unabashed exponents of the conspiracy theory [that] all history is a conspiracy,” but recognized the occurrence of “single conspiracies” (Lundberg, 1968, 273).

[7] In writing these words and reflecting on the loaded nature of the term, I recall a political incident in which I was personally involved in New Haven. At the time of the Chicago trial of the so-called “Conspiracy 7,” demonstrations were held throughout the United States in early 1970 that were called “conspiracy” protests. By employing the term and claiming to be involved in a “conspiracy,” anti-war activists were mocking the establishment’s use of the word for the purpose of maligning leading members of the movement. 

 

[8] Thus, for example, the reaction of the corporate media to Bernie Sanders’ presidential campaigns demonstrates that for the ruling class, advocacy of “democratic socialism” is more acceptable than anti-imperialism, which no Democratic Party leader dares voice support for. 

[9] See Noam Chomsky’s critique of John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt who argued in The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy that AIPAC defends its own particular interests and positions and that its influence in Washington far exceeds that of other lobbies (Chomsky, 2006). 

[10] The public debate in the U.S. over whether President Trump’s coded and overtly racist remarks have contributed to hate crimes carried out by white supremacists sheds light on the issue. There are degrees to which those responsible for this type of atrocity are removed from its execution as well as degrees of intentionality. Those who dismiss any discussion along these lines as “conspiracy theory” ignore the phenomenon’s complexity.


FOOTNOTES

[1] Laclau’s central thesis is that the salient features of populist strategies are both the polarization and head-on confrontations that their rhetoric sets in motion (referred to as the “politics of antagonism”) and the efforts to unite people with distinct interests, values and demands (the “politics of equivalence”). According to Laclau, the politics of equivalence is what politics is all about (Laclau, 2005).

[1] One example of a writer who plays down the secret dimension embodied in conspiracy theory is sociologist William Domhoff , to be discussed below. In addition, pro-system writers who defend the activity of “interest groups” in the form of lobbying, ignore the secrete nature of much of their activity (Berg, 2012, 111-13).

[1] Hellinger discusses various features of conspiracies and adds that they are “illegal…or unethical” (23).

[1] Samir Amin (2019: 34) points out that application of the term “crony capitalism” should not be reserved to South East Asia and Latin America as it also characterizes the economy of the U.S. and Europe. He adds “in its current behavior this ruling class is quite close to that of the mafia.”

[1] Elsewhere, I have argued that the two Marxist schools of thinking on the state are not incompatible and that the term “in the last instance” to refer to the exclusively fundamental role played by one of the two dynamics (instrumentalist or structural) is misleading (Ellner, 2017, 57-58; for a different version of the article see https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/13386).

[1] Another non-Marxist instrumentalist, Ferdinand Lundberg, also rejected the idea of “unabashed exponents of the conspiracy theory [that] all history is a conspiracy,” but recognized the occurrence of “single conspiracies” (Lundberg, 1968, 273).

[1] In writing these words and reflecting on the loaded nature of the term, I recall a political incident in which I was personally involved in New Haven. At the time of the Chicago trial of the so-called “Conspiracy 7,” demonstrations were held throughout the United States in early 1970 that were called “conspiracy” protests. By employing the term and claiming to be involved in a “conspiracy,” anti-war activists were mocking the establishment’s use of the word for the purpose of maligning leading members of the movement. 

 

[1] Thus, for example, the reaction of the corporate media to Bernie Sanders’ presidential campaigns demonstrates that for the ruling class, advocacy of “democratic socialism” is more acceptable than anti-imperialism, which no Democratic Party leader dares voice support for. 

[1] See Noam Chomsky’s critique of John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt who argued in The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy that AIPAC defends its own particular interests and positions and that its influence in Washington far exceeds that of other lobbies (Chomsky, 2006). 

[1] The public debate in the U.S. over whether President Trump’s coded and overtly racist remarks have contributed to hate crimes carried out by white supremacists sheds light on the issue. There are degrees to which those responsible for this type of atrocity are removed from its execution as well as degrees of intentionality. Those who dismiss any discussion along these lines as “conspiracy theory” ignore the phenomenon’s complexity.

 

Author Identification: Steve Ellner is an Associate Managing Editor of Latin American Perspectives. His latest book is his edited Latin America’s Pink Tide: Breakthroughs and Shortcomings (Rowman & Littlefield, 2020).

Wednesday, October 7, 2020

ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF NEW YORK TIMES' FAKE NEWS ABOUT VENEZUELA

It’s not so much that they lie outright, but that doesn’t make their statements any less deceptive. Today’s article “Venezuela, Once and Oil Giant, Reaches the End of an Era” says the following: 


“Soon after he was elected president in 1998, Mr. Chávez commandeered the country’s respected state oil company for his radical development program. He fired nearly 20,000 oil professionals, nationalized foreign-owned oil assets and allowed allies to plunder the oil revenues.” 


The authors, who are based in Venezuela, know full well that the firing of those professionals had nothing to do with Chávez’s “radical development program.” It’s because they participated in a two months oil shutdown for the purpose of overthrowing the government. The same would have happened to oil employees in any country in the world. Didn’t Reagan fire over 11,000 air traffic controllers in 1981 for having done much less?