Leftist Critics of Leftist Governments in Latin America Often Fail to Factor Hostility from Washington into their Analysis

What critics on the left of progressive Latin American governments often pass over is that shortcomings have to be contextualized. Certainly, criticisms are in order, and indeed are quite necessary, but the proposed strategy has to consider conditions on the ground  This is the main point I try to make in my review of “The Impasse of the Latin American Left” by several outstanding Marxists.

 

The Impasse of the Latin American Left by Franck Gaudichaud, Massimo Modonesi, and Jeffery R. Webber. Duke University Press, 2022

Review by Steve Ellner 

posted by NACLA: Report on the Americas

Can the firebrand Hugo Chávez with his embrace of "21st century socialism" be placed in the same category as the pragmatic Lula? Writers across the political spectrum make a sharp distinction between the two as well as between other radicals like Bolivia’s Evo Morales as opposed to moderate leftists like Uruguay’s Frente Amplio government. Anti-leftist writers like Jorge Castañeda, as well as some moderates, lauded Lula while denigrating Chávez (who Castañeda labelled the "bad" or "populist" left) and his followers. Others further to the left upheld the opposite position.

To a degree, the authors of The Impasse of the Latin American Left, Franck Gaudichaud, Massimo Modonesi, and Jeffery R. Webber, can be located in the opposite camp from that of Castañeda. The authors view the radical 21st-century Latin American governments more favorably than those of the moderate left. They credit Chávez for being largely alone in achieving certain structural economic changes through expropriations. In contrast, Brazil, according to the authors, became a “sub-imperial” power with 80 percent of its exports going elsewhere in the region in the form of “industrialized products of high or (mostly) medium grade technology,” largely in return for natural resources and other primary products from its neighbors.

In spite of the obvious differences between the radicals and the moderates, many authors place both groups of governments in the same category and view them as part of the same phenomenon, referred to as the Pink Tide. After all, Pink Tide leaders all followed a fairly nationalistic foreign policy and privileged social programs targeting the non-incorporated sectors of the population. Another common denominator is that, in the words of the authors, Pink Tide governments “represent a significant break with neoliberalism.”   

Finally, Pink Tide governments, both those committed to socialism and those which weren’t, were subject to considerable hostility and threats from Washington and its allies. Brazil, one of the “moderates,” is an example. The hearty reception received in the U.S. capital by former federal judge Sergio Moro, whose “clandestine collaboration with state prosecutors” led to Lula’s jailing, is just one manifestation of Washington’s preferences.

Gaudichaud, Modonesi and Webber, while recognizing these key differences among moderate and more leftist governments, argue that the theory of “passive revolution” first formulated by Antonio Gramsci is applicable to the entire Pink Tide phenomenon, even Venezuela. Viewed through this lens, the Pink Tide governments are not “direct expressions” of either the dominant classes or the popular sectors and thus enjoy a relative autonomy, but they are dedicated to achieving a “reformist conservative project.”

In the framework of passive revolution theory, the feature most emphasized in the book is the Pink Tide’s tight control and demobilization of social movements. Popular movements were essential elements in the rise to power of the Pink Tide: in the case of Brazil and Bolivia, Lula and Morales emerged from them, and in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Argentina, they forced presidents out of power. The book’s authors allege that Pink Tide governments and parties ended up taming and disciplining social movements and in other cases marginalizing them.

The authors point to a “polarization” among analysts on the left regarding the Pink Tide phenomenon. On the one hand, a pro group includes “unconditional and uncritical apologists.” On the other are the critics. The latter camp, what the authors call “a rainbow of critics from the left,” consists of the defenders of different isms, including anti-capitalism, libertarian autonomism, environmentalism, and postcolonialism (emphasizing Indigenous rights and communities). The anti-capitalist critique, which most resembles the views of the authors, highlights the Pink Tide’s class alliances with sectors of the bourgeoisie. Along these lines, the authors point to the alliance between the older landed oligarchies and agribusiness multinationals, which cemented the “structural continuities” between the neoliberal years and the Pink Tide period. The most anti-Pink Tide critique comes from the champions of “libertarian autonomism,” as represented by Uruguayan author Raúl Zibechi, who views the Pink Tide as a “step backward” and denies its anti-neoliberal character.

The book’s critique of the Pink Tide is thorough and backed by solid evidence. The errors and flaws of the Pink Tide included the failure to significantly reduce the levels of corruption that characterized the previous neoliberal period; the tendency toward deindustrialization; the ecological damage that accompanied the extractivist model; the failure to consult rural communities including Indigenous ones; and the failure to respect social movement autonomy. Considering the book’s empirical strongpoints, its shortcomings are not so much what it says but what it leaves out or downplays.

First, in spite of its discussion of the devastating impact of U.S. interventionism, the book fails to factor imperialism into the analysis of the causes of the Pink Tide’s allegedly erroneous policies and strategy. To take an extreme example, Washington’s hostile actions against Venezuela turned into a virtual war on Venezuela beginning with Obama’s 2015 decree declaring the nation a threat to U.S. national security and then with the Trump administration’s suffocating sanctions and support for military actions. In the face of these seemingly insurmountable challenges, the authors would have had the Chavista governments go on the offensive. Along these lines, they point out that the countries that most confronted imperialism (i.e. Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador) were precisely the “ones that have restored revolutionary symbolism to prominence,” thus implying a correlation between imperialist offensives and Pink Tide radicalization. But the opposite could be argued, namely that in the face of such ruthless actions by the world’s most powerful nation in history, a defensive strategy was in order. This is precisely the current line of thinking of Nicolás Maduro’s followers, some of whom point to Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP) as an instructive precedent. In a war-like situation, expectations of change need to be tempered by the realities on the ground, and this reality needs to be taken into account in any analysis of demobilization, the curtailment of democratic liberties, and extractivism, all at the center of the authors’ concerns. To give one example: Venezuela’s failure to diversify the economy was undoubtedly related to the imperative of countering destabilization campaigns by stimulating active support among the popular sectors. Ambitious social programs, more than economic structural transformation, promised to achieve this in the short run.

Without going so far as to advocate one policy over another, I would criticize the book for failing to address the issue of how strategies have to be crafted on the basis of different conditions on both international and national stages.

Second, as the authors show through the prism of the theory of passive revolution, the Pink Tide leaders in power attempted to control the social movements that were initially sympathetic to their governments. What the authors largely pass over is that this exertion of control was a tendency, but not one that completely demobilized the movements to the extent that they lost all vitality or were completely alienated from the government.

The most striking example is the events in Bolivia that were partly underway at the time of the writing of the book. Social movement activists and leaders who had adamantly opposed Morales’s extractivist policies—even the one furthest to the left, Felipe Quispe—joined forces in opposing the right-wing government of Jeanine Añez. They forced new elections and supported the Pink Tide MAS party in the presidential contests of October 2020. Another example is the active support by the iconic Landless Workers Movement (MST), in partnership with the Pink Tide’s Workers’ Party, for Lula’s candidacy in the upcoming presidential elections slated for October 2022. Still another example is the election of the leading figure of Venezuela’s commune movement, Ángel Prado, as a mayor in 2021 on the ticket of the Pink Tide’s United Socialist Party (PSUV), in spite of the bitter clashes between the two in the past.   

Third, the authors are totally opposed to the Pink Tide government alliances with “one or more ruling-class fractions,” but they fail to distinguish between strategic and tactical alliances. The differences between the two couldn't be greater. Some of these arrangements were, at least at first, tactical in that they were pragmatically motivated with a short-term time frame. In Venezuela and Bolivia, for instance, they were designed to counter violent and economically devastating disruptions actively supported by powerful business organizations in order to bring about regime change. In many Pink Tide countries there was a practical consideration: why should government contracts go to businesspeople who were set on regime change? So alliances were formed with those businesspeople who, for whatever reason they may have had, did not join the unprincipled and ruthless attacks on the government. In short, the issue of alliances was a complex one. The authors recognize the diversity of the alliances “according to different national contexts,” but fail to discuss diverse government motivations, some of which were hardly opportunistically driven.

Fourth, the authors are sympathetic to and frequently cite leftist intellectuals, activists, and organizations, but ones that for the most part lack a significant political following in their respective nations. Indeed, they have failed to make inroads to fill the gap on the left created by Pink Tide defeats after 2015. Argentine former president Cristina Fernández famously pointed to the marginal status of many of the leftist critics of her government, saying “You know what there is to my left? Nothing but the wall.” Gaudichaud, Modonesi, and Webber recognize the weakness of those they support and partly blame it on Pink Tide leaders for calling them “traitors” and “sham revolutionaries.” The criticism is well founded as Pink Tide leaders in Venezuela, Ecuador, and elsewhere have displayed a degree of sectarianism in their dealings with critics to their left.

Criticisms notwithstanding, the Pink Tide’s staying power over the last two decades is impressive. Its recent comeback has been due to the electoral gains scored by moderate presidential candidates who follow a pragmatic approach rather than the hardline one proposed by the authors. This has occurred in Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Honduras (plus Andrés Arauz's near victory in Ecuador).

 

The Impasse of the Latin American Left presents a valuable analysis that contributes to the understanding of the Pink Tide phenomenon, but, in my opinion, doesn’t tell the whole story. Errors and shortcomings have to be contextualized not by simply recognizing the existence of adverse conditions but by addressing the issue of the feasibility of options. To the authors’ credit, however, the theory of passive revolution effectively frames the key issue of demobilization which should be the point of departure of any serious analysis of the topic from a leftist perspective. The lessons of the Pink Tide, rigorously explored by the authors, have become increasingly relevant now that it is making a comeback—a comeback that can only be understood in the context of recognizing the well-conceived policies implemented by those governments as well as their errors. 

Steve Ellner is a retired professor at Venezuela’s Universidad de Oriente and is currently an Associate Managing Editor of Latin American Perspectives. He is editor of Latin American Extractivism: Dependency, Resource Nationalism, and Resistance in Broad Perspective (2021); his co-edited Latin American Social Movements and Progressive Governments: Creative Tensions between Resistance and Convergence will be released later this year.

https://nacla.org/impasse-latin-american-left-review

 

 

Ex-Defense Secretary Mark Esper’s new book puts in full view the extent of U.S. military plans against Venezuela. This is a bombshell news item which the corporate media, par for the course, are largely ignoring

A newly released book by former Defense Secretary Mark Esper reveals how closely and actively Washington was involved in attempts at regime change in Venezuela through the use of force. It also shows that U.S.-recognized “president” of Venezuela Juan Guaidó approved of these plans and pushed for an outright U.S. invasion of his country. Not surprisingly, the corporate media has provided scant coverage of this bombshell publication which should have been the subject of banner headlines. In any other “democratic” country in the world, that would have been the case.

https://www.mintpressnews.com/mark-esper-reveals-us-plans-war-terror-against-venezuela/280930/
 

Social movements have paved the way for the rise to power of progressive governments in Latin America. Their relationship is complex

 

Many left critics of twenty-first century Latin American progressive governments apply the “theory of passive revolution,” which claims that social movements were tightly controlled and demobilized. The fact that popular movements were key to the recent comeback of progressives in elections throughout the region would indicate that the relationship between progressive governments and social movement was more complex and less parasitic than these writers claim. This is the central thesis of Latin American Social Movements and Progressive Governments: Creative Tensions between Resistance and Convergence which Rowman and Littlefield will release later this year

En el fondo, Biden no ha cambiado la política fracasada de Trump hacia Venezuela

Consortium News - Rebelion.org

Pareciera que el repetitivo llamado del Presidente Nicolás Maduro en favor del diálogo con EE.UU. para normalizar las relaciones comienza a surtir efecto. Esta postura contrasta con la nebulosidad del gobierno de Biden en cuanto al grado en el cual está dispuesto reconocer al gobierno de Maduro (el restablecimiento de relaciones normales no está bajo consideración por parte de Washington). El uso de sanciones como una moneda de cambio con el fin de sacar concesiones de Caracas es cínico y más difícil de vender al público que la narrativa de Trump sobre el cambio de régimen en base al principio de “Responsabilidad de Proteger” (R2P), a veces llamado “intervención humanitaria”.  

Durante los últimos dos meses, los giros y la timidez del gobierno de Biden han estado a la vista de todos. A comienzos de marzo, Biden envió una delegación de alto nivel a Caracas para hablar con Maduro, pero inmediatamente después se echó atrás en vista de la furibunda reacción del bloque congresista de Florida encabezado por los Senadores Marco Rubio y Rick Scott conjuntamente con el Senador Bob Menendez. La portavoz de la Casa Blanca Jen Psaki dijo a los periodistas que no deben perder su tiempo “especulando sobre la posibilidad de que EE.UU. va a importar el petróleo… de Venezuela”.

Sin embargo, más recientemente el Economist reportó que Washington va a retomar las conversaciones con representantes del gobierno de Maduro en una reunión que estaba programada para Trinidad. Sin embargo, el Secretario Adjunto de Estado para Asuntos del Hemisferio Occidental de EE.UU. Brian Nichols negó la veracidad del artículo del Economist y aseveró que el único asunto bajo discusión en la reunión en Caracas en marzo tuvo que ver con la democracia venezolana. Lo que Nicholas dijo contradijo un comentario emitido por la Casa Blanca en el cual informó que la reunión de marzo tocó el tema de “la seguridad energética global”.  

Para muchos centristas, el hecho de que el gobierno de Biden no esté llevando a cabo las acciones y amenazas militares empleadas por Trump parece ser benigno y un paso en la dirección correcta. Esta impresión está reforzada por los ataques beligerantes contra Biden por parte del bloque congresista de Florida por su uso de “sanciones impuestas al régimen de Maduro como moneda de cambio con una dictadura ilegítima para producir más petróleo”. Rubio y compañía lamentaron que el contacto con Maduro representó un reconocimiento tácito a su gobierno al mismo tiempo que minara la legitimidad del “presidente” Juan Guaidó. Como parte de la campaña basada en Florida, el gobernador derechista Ron DeSantis habló en una manifestación en contra de la compra de petróleo venezolano – el supuesto propósito de las conversaciones en Caracas con Maduro.

La renuencia de Biden (o su inhabilidad) de explicar con audacia y defender el cambio de su política a los votantes norteamericanos también contrasta con Obama, quien puso sus cartas sobre la mesa cuando reestableció relaciones diplomáticas con Cuba.

En efecto, es difícil saber exactamente lo que Biden tiene en mente en cuanto a cómo proceder, presumiendo que él mismo lo sepa. Brian Winter, vicepresidente del Consejo de las Américas tenía razón al decir en marzo que “mientras no sepamos lo que la administración de Biden está tratando de lograr, será difícil evaluar hasta dónde puede llegar este descongelamiento”. 

El Efecto Dominó

Las iniciativas de Biden han favorecido a Maduro, inclusive en sus relaciones con Brasil – aunque parezca mentira. A finales de abril, el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores brasileño Carlos França aseveró que “en este momento en que los EE.UU. está considerando la posibilidad de hacer una excepción al embargo sobre las exportaciones petroleras venezolanas, me parece que podemos pensar en términos de reevaluar el asunto de nuestras relaciones diplomáticas”. Exactamente dos años antes, Bolsonaro había cerrado la embajada brasileña en Venezuela.

Poco después, el presidente mexicano Andrés Manuel López Obrador llamó a Biden para discutir la Novena Cumbre de las Américas que está pautada para principios de junio en Los Ángeles. El insistió a Biden que “todos los países de las Américas reciban una invitación, sin excluir a nadie”. Poco antes que López Obrador hiciera su llamada, Brian Nichols del Departamento de Estado se había dirigido a los periodistas acerca de la cumbre y dijo en referencia a Venezuela, Cuba y Nicaragua, “ellos probablemente no van a estar allá”.

El efecto dominó de la delegación de marzo también llegó al presidente conservador ecuatoriano Guillermo Lasso. En una rueda de prensa conjunta con el presidente argentino Alberto Fernández, Lasso dijo que su gobierno vio con buenos ojos la reconciliación entre EE.UU. y Venezuela y que él estaba dispuesto considerar el re-establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas con Caracas. Por su parte, Fernández defendió la decisión de su gobierno de establecer relaciones completas con Venezuela y urgió a otros países de la región hacer lo mismo, y agregó “Venezuela está en una situación difícil”.

La creciente oposición en contra del ostracismo de Venezuela va a ser difícil de contener para Washington, sobre todo en vista de las victorias de la izquierda y centro-izquierda desde 2018 en México, Argentina, Bolivia, y más recientemente Chile y Honduras. Candidatos progresistas están favorecidos para ganar las próximas elecciones presidenciales en Colombia y Brasil.

No Se Trata Solamente del Petróleo  

Los medios de comunicación corporativos atribuyeron el abrupto abandono por parte de Biden a su iniciativa hacia Venezuela a la reacción reacia de Rubio y compañía. Y tenían la razón, pero a medias. Eso es debido a que el Departamento de Estado tuvo que haber anticipado las consecuencias políticas cuando la delegación fue a Venezuela para negociar la reanudación del flujo de petróleo para compensar por la escasez que ha resultado como consecuencia de las sanciones contra Rusia.  

El gobierno de Biden pudo haberse echado atrás, no tanto por las predecibles pataletas de Rubio y compañía, sino porque Washington no logró lo que quería. El objetivo de la delegación norteamericana no tenía que ver solamente con el petróleo. Así que la BBC de Londres concluyó: “Puede ser que la visita de EE.UU. tuvo que ver no solamente con el asunto del petróleo. ¿Quizás tenía que ver también con el cambio de las alineaciones políticas internacionales”?  En las palabras del Financial Times (9 de marzo de 2022, p. 4) el propósito fue “persuadir a Maduro alejarse de los abrazos de Moscú”, y asumir una posición más neutral sobre la invasión de Ucrania. El congresista Gregory Meeks, quien dirige la Comisión de Asuntos Extranjeros de la Cámara de Representantes dijo lo mismo: “La interacción con Venezuela sirve para empujar a Venezuela fuera de la influencia maligna de Vladimir Putin”.

El problema con Maduro, quien ha hecho todo posible para demostrar a Washington que es amigable hacia el capital extranjero, es que se rehusó a dar la espalda a Putin. Por ejemplo, Venezuela reconoció la independencia de las dos repúblicas del este de Ucrania horas después de que Moscú hiciera lo mismo. Inmediatamente después de que la delegación salió de Caracas en marzo, Maduro dio a Washington una luz de esperanza cuando pronunció en favor de un diálogo entre Rusia y Ucrania, pero luego reiteró su apoyo incondicional para Moscú.

Hay un componente ideológico en la posición de Maduro sobre Ucrania. De acuerdo con él, EE.UU. quiere “destruirlo [Rusia] en pedacitos y acabar con la esperanza de un mundo multipolar donde todos podamos vivir”.

Con el comienzo de la Guerra Fría II, las consideraciones geopolíticas representan una mayor prioridad para la política extranjera norteamericana. Como dice John Mearsheimer, un estratega renombrado perteneciente a la escuela de realismo, la seguridad del hemisferio es de mayor importancia para Washington que los conflictos en otras partes del mundo ya que le da a EE.UU. una ventaja sobre sus adversarios ubicados en regiones caracterizadas por enfrentamientos bélicos. La misma tesis predice que otros grandes poderes (China y Rusia) tratarán de desafiar la hegemonía regional en la “vecindad” de los EE.UU, o sea, América Latina. La alianza estratégica de Caracas con Rusia, que incluye el despliegue de buques de guerra rusos en los puertos venezolanos, asume una importancia especial cuando se ve desde el marco del análisis de Mearsheimer.

La estrategia de Biden hacia Venezuela basada en la moneda de cambio consiste en el levantamiento de algunas de las 502 estimadas medidas coactivas a cambio de concesiones diseñadas para lograr dos objetivos: proveer a los EE.UU. el petróleo tan necesitado en este momento de escasez e influenciar la política exterior de Maduro. Juan Gonzalez, de la línea dura de Washington quien encabezó la delegación a Venezuela en marzo, indicó claramente que el uso de las sanciones va más allá de sus objetivos anunciados: “Las sanciones contra Rusia son tan fuertes que van a tener un impacto sobre aquellos gobiernos que tienen afiliaciones económicas con Rusia, y eso es a propósito”.

Bloomberg News articuló la estrategia “blanda” empleada por el gobierno de Biden en un editorial titulado “Acercándose a Venezuela a Pesar de los Riesgos”. La propuesta de regateo consiste en lo siguiente: “A cambio de la suspensión de la cooperación militar con Rusia, el gobierno de Biden puede levantar algunas sanciones contra Caracas para permitir que el país importe equipos para mejorar las facilidades de producción y reanudar la venta de petróleo a EE.UU. Luego Bloomberg insistió en ser exigente: “Cualquier paso hacia la normalización debe estar condicionado a la disposición de Venezuela de acelerar sus reformas económicas amigables al capital privado” mientras que Washington continuaría reconociendo a Guaidó como presidente. Bloomberg entonces resumió su planteamiento: “Aunque parece repugnante, negociar con Venezuela es esencial para proteger los intereses básicos norteamericanos y contener la influencia rusa en el hemisferio”.

La estrategia de Biden tiene mucho en común con las amenazas de Trump y sus acciones a favor del derrocamiento de Maduro a través de la fuerza militar. En ambos casos, se ignora la voluntad del pueblo venezolano como también su sufrimiento. La situación actual es incluso más repulsiva que antes, porque las monedas de cambio anteriormente fueron diseñadas para presionar a Venezuela a revisar su política económica pero ahora hay un objetivo adicional: la reorientación de su política extranjera. Aquellos centristas pro-Biden que ven su política hacia Venezuela como más “humanitaria” no toman en cuenta el grado en el cual el bienestar del pueblo venezolano está alejado de los cálculos de Washington y sus maniobras políticas.

 

Publicado en inglés por Consortium News y traducido con la ayuda de Carmen Sánchez de Ellner y Michelle Ellner

Steve Ellner es profesor jubilado de la Universidad de Oriente en Venezuela y actualmente es editor asociado de la revista Latin American Perspectives. Su último libro es el coeditado Latin American Social Movements and Progressive Governments: Creative Tensions between Resistance and Convergence (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023).

 

Biden Vacillates, Venezuela’s Maduro Gains Ground

Posted by Consortium News

President Nicolas Maduro's repeated calls for dialogue with the U.S. in order to normalize relations seem to be paying off. His openness to rapprochement contrasts with the Biden administration's nebulousness regarding the degree to which Washington is willing to recognize Maduro as president (full diplomatic recognition is out of the question). Biden’s use of sanctions as a bargaining chip to wrest concessions from Caracas is a harder sell than Trump’s regime- change narrative on the basis of the preposterous Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, sometimes referred to as “humanitarian intervention.”

Over the last two months, the flip flops and timidity of the Biden administration have been put on full display. In early March, Biden sent a high-level delegation to Caracas to talk to Maduro, but then just days later backed off in response to the backlash led by Florida’s congressional bloc headed by Senators Marco Rubio and Rick Scott and seconded by Senator Bob Menendez. Biden spokeswoman Jen Psaki told journalists not to waste their time speculating “about the future of the United States importing oil at this point in time…from Venezuela."

More recently, the Economist reported that the Biden administration is planning to reengage Maduro’s representatives in a meeting in Trinidad. Shortly thereafter, however, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Brian Nichols denied the report and claimed that the only issue under discussion in the March meeting in Caracas was related to Venezuelan democracy. The remark contradicts a previous White House statement that the March meeting discussed “global energy security.”

For many centrists, the Biden administration’s ruling out of the military threats and actions employed by Trump appears to be benign and a step in the right direction. That appearance is enhanced by the belligerent attacks on Biden by the Florida congressional bloc for his use of “sanctions placed on the Maduro regime as a bargaining chip with an illegitimate dictatorship to produce more oil.” Their statement decries Washington’s engagement with Maduro for representing a tacit recognition of his government and undermining the legitimacy of Venezuela’s bogus president Juan Guaidó. As part of the Florida-based campaign, Governor Ron DeSantis spoke at a rally against buying Venezuelan oil – the supposed purpose of the talks with Maduro.

Biden’s unwillingness (or inability) to boldly explain and defend his change of policy to U.S. voters also contrasts with Obama, who put his cards on the table when he reestablished diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Indeed, it’s hard to know exactly what Biden has in mind as to how to proceed, assuming he himself knows. Brian Winter, vice president of the Council of the Americas was right in saying at the time of the first delegation to Venezuela that “until we know precisely what the Biden administration is trying to achieve, it’ll be difficult to evaluate how far this détente can go.”

The Ripple Effect

Biden’s overtures have worked to Maduro’s advantage, even with, of all places, Brazil. In late April, Brazil’s Foreign Minister Carlos França stated “At a moment in which the United States considers making an exception to the embargo on Venezuelan oil exports, it seems to me that we can think in terms of reevaluating the issue of diplomatic relations.” Exactly two years before, Bolsonaro had closed Brazil’s embassy in Venezuela.

Following suit on April 29, Mexico’s Andrés Manuel López Obrador called Biden to discuss the Ninth Summit of the Americas to be held in Los Angeles in early June. He urged Biden for "all the countries of the Americas [to] receive an invitation, without excluding anyone." Shortly before López Obrador made the call, the State Department’s Brian Nichols had addressed reporters on the upcoming Summit stating, in reference to Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua, “they are unlikely to be there.”  

The ripple effect of Washington’s diplomatic mission to Venezuela also reached Ecuador’s conservative president Guillermo Lasso. In a joint press conference with Argentina’s Alberto Fernández, Lasso stated that his government welcomed the rapprochement between the U.S. and Venezuela and would consider reestablishing diplomatic relations with the latter. Fernández, for his part, defended his government’s decision to reestablish full relations with Venezuela and called on other countries in the region to do the same, noting “Venezuela has had a difficult time.”

This groundswell in opposition to Venezuela’s ostracization is going to be hard for Washington to contain, especially in light of left and center-left electoral victories since 2018 in Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, and more recently Chile and Honduras. Progressive candidates are slated to win in upcoming presidential elections in Colombia and Brazil.  

It’s Not Just the Oil

The mainstream media attributed the Biden administration’s abrupt abandonment of its Venezuelan initiative to the backlash from Rubio and company. And they were right. Actually, half right. After all, the State Department had to have anticipated the political consequences when they sent the delegation to Venezuela apparently to negotiate the resumption of oil flows to compensate for shortages resulting from the sanctions against Russia.

The Biden administration may have balked, not because of the predictable outcry from Rubio and company, but because Washington didn’t get what it wanted. After all the delegation’s objective was not just about oil. That’s what the BBC concluded: “So, could the US visit be more than just oil? An attempt to change Venezuela's political allegiances, perhaps?” In the words of the Financial Times (March 9, 2022, p. 4) it was to “coax Maduro away from Moscow’s embrace”, and assume a more neutral stand on the Ukraine invasion. Congressman Gregory Meeks, Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said the same when he stated “re-engagement with Venezuela… serves to shift Venezuela away from the malign influence of Vladimir Putin.”

The problem is that Maduro, who has leaned over backwards to assure Washington that he has become investment friendly toward big oil, refused to turn his back on Putin. Thus Venezuela recognized the independence of eastern Ukraine’s two separatist republics just hours after Putin did. Immediately after the U.S. mission left Caracas in March, Maduro gave Washington a glimmer of hope when he called for dialogue between Moscow and Ukraine, but then reiterated his unconditional support for Moscow.

There is an ideological component to Maduro’s position on Ukraine. The U.S., according to him, wants to “destroy it [Russia] in pieces and end the hope of a multi-polar world where we can all live.”  

Now that Cold War II has set in, geopolitical considerations become a greater priority for U.S. foreign policy. As John Mearsheimer, a leading strategist belonging to the school of realism of international relations, has pointed out, maintaining a secure hemisphere is of greater concern than conflicts elsewhere in the world since it provides the U.S. with an advantage over adversaries located in regions characterized by strife. The same thesis predicts that other great powers (read China and Russia) will attempt to challenge “regional hegemony,” in the U.S.’s “neighborhood.” Caracas’ strategic alliance with Moscow, which includes Russia’s deployment of warships in Venezuelan ports, takes on a special significance within the framework of Mearsheimer’s line of thinking.

Biden’s bargaining-chip strategy toward Venezuela of lifting some of Washington’s estimated 502 coercive measures in return for concessions is designed to achieve two sets of objectives: providing the United States with much-needed oil and influencing Maduro’s foreign policy. Juan Gonzalez, the hard-liner who headed the delegation to Venezuela in March, clearly indicated that the use of sanctions goes far beyond their stated purpose: “The sanctions on Russia are so robust that they will have an impact on those governments that have economic affiliations with Russia, that is by design,”

Bloomberg News spelled out the “soft-power” strategy employed by the Biden administration in an editorial titled “Approaching Venezuela is Worth the Risk.” The horse-trading proposal would consist of the following: ‘In exchange for Venezuela suspending its military cooperation with Russia, the Biden Administration should lift some sanctions against Caracas to allow the country to import equipment to upgrade production facilities and resume oil sales to the United States.” Bloomberg went on to call for tough bargaining: “Any further steps toward normalization should be conditioned on Venezuela’s willingness to accelerate market-oriented economic reforms” at the same time that Washington would continue to recognize Guaidó. Bloomberg then summarized its approach: “Unpalatable as it may be, engaging with the Venezuelan regime is critical to protecting core U.S. interests and containing Russian influence in the Western Hemisphere.”

Biden’s horse-trading strategy has much in common with Trump’s threats and actions in favor of regime change through military force. In both cases, the will of Venezuelans is ignored as is their suffering. What makes the current situation even more despicable is that the bargaining chips were formerly designed to get Venezuela to revise economic policy and now there is an added objective, namely a change in foreign policy. Those pro-Biden centrists who see his approach to Venezuela as more “humanitarian,” fail to consider how far removed the Venezuelan people are from Washington’s calculations and political maneuvers.

 

Steve Ellner is a retire professor from the Universidad de Oriente in Venezuela and is currently an associate managing editor of Latin American Perspectives. His latest books are his edited Latin American Extractivism: Dependency, Resource Nationalism and Resistance in Comparative Perspective (Rowman & Littlefield, 2021) and his co–edited Latin American Social Movements and Progressive Governments: Creative Tensions between Resistance and Convergence (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023).

https://consortiumnews.com/2022/05/05/biden-vacillates-as-venezuelas-maduro-gains-ground/?fbclid=IwAR3nER8MyLLXZhAqgFuLHlNpAfE03yxeASKwTes_6EMU8p3rACfz7aszg1o