A Simplistic Analysis of the Maduro Government that Leaves Much Unsaid
By Steve Ellner*
Gabriel Hetland’s article “Capitalism
and Authoritarianism in Maduro’s Venezuela,” published in New Labor Forum
and then reposted in Links and other webpages, presents a one-sided and
decontextualized view of Venezuela under the presidency of Nicolás Maduro.
According to Hetland, the Maduro government is virtually devoid of any
redeeming characteristics. Hetland refers approvingly to the claim made by
Maduro’s harshest critics on the left that Maduro and the right-wing opposition
are “‘two sides of the same coin.’”
Any serious examination
of Venezuela under Maduro needs to incorporate the impact of U.S.-imposed
economic sanctions into the analysis and not simply make passing reference to
them. The Washington-engineered economic war significantly
undermined the effectiveness of potentially sound policies initiated by Maduro.
To dismiss these policies as evidence of incompetence—or to ignore them
altogether, as Hetland does—is misleading. More important, the negative effects
of the interface between Venezuelan government policy and Washington’s acts of
aggression have to be placed at the center of analysis.
Hetland’s black-and-white approach does a disservice
to the complex and, in many respects, unique experience of Chavismo. A more
nuanced and critical examination is essential if we are to draw the necessary
lessons from the nation’s unfolding political process.
To begin with, the same criteria cannot be used to
evaluate governments such as those of Venezuela or Cuba, as used to analyze progressive
governments like Brazil under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, or
Argentina under the Kirchners (Néstor and Cristina). The illegal and semi-legal
actions undertaken by both Washington and Venezuela’s right-wing opposition, with
strong U.S. backing, have been numerous and relentless since nearly the
beginning of the Chávez presidency, and in many ways were intensified under
Maduro. These include abortive coups, assassination attempts against both
Chávez and Maduro (including one involving drones[1]), Washington’s recognition
of de facto governments, open appeals by top U.S. officials urging Venezuelan
military officers to intervene, invasions by paramilitary forces from Colombia,
covert and public international campaigns to isolate Venezuela, foreign funding
of opposition groups on a scale far exceeding that provided for neighboring
nations, widespread and protracted street violence aimed at regime change, and
sweeping secondary sanctions to pressure corporations and governments around
the world to avoid commercial dealings with Venezuela – amounting in practice to
a de facto embargo. All of these actions have been extensively documented.[2]
The full scope of the war on Venezuela has to be
brought into the picture. Yet Hetland’s readers are left unaware of what the
Maduro government is up against.
The details of the impact of the war on Venezuela are far
more than a matter of academic interest. They are an essential element in the
debate over whether the Maduro presidency should be deemed an outright failure,
a view defended by the right and segments of the left, including Hetland. Far
from recognizing the multifaceted nature of the aggression against Venezuela, this
perspective reduces it to the issue of the sanctions which are considered to be
no more – and in many cases far less – responsible for the nation’s economic misfortunes
than Maduro’s errors and alleged incompetence. In doing so, these Maduro
critics underestimate the devastating effect of the war on Venezuela,
especially given that Maduro’s errors in many cases were overreactions to Washington-backed
provocations.
Furthermore, Washington has systematically countered every
initiative undertaken by the Maduro government to address the economic
difficulties facing the nation. For this reason, any
rigorous analysis of the government's shortcomings must give due weight to the
sustained campaign waged by Washington against Venezuela. For example, when the
Maduro government attempted to renegotiate the foreign debt in response to the
sharp decline in oil prices, Trump in August 2017 prohibited the trading of
Venezuelan bonds in U.S. markets. Maduro then responded to Washington’s measures
against the Venezuelan oil industry[3] by turning to gold exports,
but in 2018 Trump issued an executive order banning the purchase of Venezuelan
gold. Simultaneously, the Maduro government launched a crypto currency called the
Petro to bypass the U.S.-controlled SWIFT system, which had caused numerous
banks to avoid transactions involving Venezuela – what Maduro called a
financial “blockade” by the U.S. government. Trump then responded with another executive
order prohibiting the use of Petros under U.S. jurisdiction.
Now the second Trump administration has refused to
renew “licenses” which the Biden administration had granted Chevron and other
corporations for their activity in Venezuela, just at a time when the nation’s
oil industry was beginning to enjoy a slow but steady recovery of levels of
production. Maduro had reformulated oil policy in order to facilitate the
granting of the licenses.
These are just a few examples of how Washington was
able to thwart Venezuelan initiatives. They clearly illustrated the extent to
which Maduro’s options were limited and raises the broader question of what
options were available. Certainly, Maduro’s rapprochement with the private
sector – specifically what Hetland refers to as the “inter-bourgeois pact”
involving both traditional business interests (grouped in Fedecámaras) and the emerging
business sector (pejoratively labeled the boliburguesía) – should be debated.
In my opinion, however, the discussion should center on the concrete terms of these
alliances and not on whether such alliances are justified under current
circumstances. Claiming that Maduro sold out is not conducive to open,
dogmatic-free debate on the matter. Hetland acknowledges that prevailing
conditions did not allow Maduro to advance toward a “socialist transformation,”
as advocated by some groups further to the left.[4] But if he opposes
alliances with the private sector, one is left to ask: What course of action does
he support?
The strategy of developmentalism – which in Latin
America was based on an alliance between the left-leaning governments and
business sectors -- may represent a viable non-socialist option in an acute
situation like that faced by the Maduro government. Hetland alleges that Maduro
“has not presided over developmentalism in any way,” yet offers no evidence to
support the claim. Maduro, however, in his 2025 annual Speech
to the Nation announced that 85 percent of the food sold in supermarkets is now
“Made in Venezuela,” the inverse of the situation ten years earlier. If accurate,
this shift is largely due to a “strategic
alliance” between agricultural interests and the government, currently coordinated
through the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Industry and National
Production. A rigorous critical analysis would acknowledge Maduro's claims and then
present empirical evidence to challenge them, or identify specific shortcomings
in the implementation of developmentalism.
Hetland leaves much out of the picture and fails to confront
certain positions on the left that do not coincide with his. He makes no
reference, for instance, to the government-promoted communes (community
production units), whose existence contradicts the notion that Maduro is really
a neoliberal in leftist disguise. Although Maduro had downplayed the communes
for several years, more recently he has injected energy into them, declaring
2023 “the Year of the Communes.” Chris Gilbert explores this revitalization in Commune
or Nothing! Venezuela’s Communal Movement and its Socialist Project, drawing
extensively on personal observations and interviews throughout the country. Gilbert’s
work shines light on the position of critical support for Maduro, a perspective
that came to the fore at the founding congress of the Communard Union in March
2022. That point of view was articulated by Angel Prado, the head of El Maizal,
the nation’s most successful commune, which hosted the event.[5] The following year, Maduro
appointed Prado as Minister of the Communes. Despite his history of confrontations
with the Venezuelan government and ruling party, Prado continues to view the
state as a contested arena, where remnants of the “bourgeois state” are pitted
against the communes and other popular forces.
The experience of Prado and the communes is clearly at
odds with Hetland’s interpretation of the Venezuelan government under Maduro. Hetland
makes no mention of critical supporters among writers and political figures
both Venezuelans and non-Venezuelans, but refers extensively to the recently
formed group “Comunes,” composed of leftists who supported Chávez and now demonize
Maduro.
Similarly, in his discussion of the protests that
followed the July 28, 2024 presidential elections, Hetland fails to take into
account a viewpoint on the left that runs counter to his own. He writes: “The
government responded to the largely peaceful protests with brutal repression,
arresting around two thousand protesters.” There is a different side of the
story coming from the Left, although the two sides may not be totally mutually
exclusive. Following the two days of protest on July 29 and 30, Attorney
General Tarek William Saab presented extensive evidence alleging that on those
two days delinquents in cahoots with the Venezuelan right carried out attacks on
symbols of the state: 11
Metro installations, 28 metrobuses, 27 police vehicles, 27 statues, 57
educational institutions, 10 National Electoral Council facilities, and 10 headquarters
of the governing party. Prior to Chávez’s rise to power, Saab was a leading
champion of human rights and his denunciations of violence instigated by the
opposition deserve to be considered seriously, even if they are ultimately refuted.
Another example of Hetland’s lack of objectivity is
his accusation that I justify political repression in Venezuela—an assertion he
fails to substantiate. Given the gravity of the charge, there is no excuse for
making it without carefully examining the facts. Hetland cites my use of the
term “taking the gloves off” in reference to Maduro: “Therefore, while it may
be regrettable that Maduro has engaged in repression (‘taking the gloves off’),
this [according to Ellner] is more or less justified.” Yet my statement conveyed
something quite different. What I actually wrote was: “Some
left analysts fault Maduro for taking off the gloves and not abiding by the
norms of liberal democracy. In some cases, the criticisms are valid but they
have to be contextualized.”
Contextualization is not the same as justification. To
take an extreme example, one may point out that NATO’s eastern expansion has
long been a source of great concern for Russian leaders. The statement,
however, does not necessarily signify support for Putin’s decision to invade
Ukraine.
In fact, I criticized important aspects of Maduro’s “playing
hard ball” and “taking the gloves off” strategy. I called the government’s
official recognition of a small splinter faction of the Communist Party of
Venezuela (PCV) – rather than the main party that included all the principal Communist
leaders – “a minus for the Maduro government.” I also noted that the same tactic
had previously been used against other opposition parties, which I stated “undeniably…
flouted the constitution.”[6]
Hetland’s portrayal of my views reflect a broader
trend in writing on the left that polarizes discussion on the Venezuelan
government – in which Maduro is either demonized or viewed uncritically. This binary
framing leaves little room for other positions, such as that of critical
support for Maduro. At the outset of his article, Hetland alleges that I defend
Maduro but with “caveats.” He then poses the question: “Is Maduro an
anti-imperialist revolutionary with democratic legitimacy?” The very framing of
the issue precludes a nuanced analysis. Rather than identifying the “caveats,” Hetland
attempts to refute my central arguments by labeling the Maduro government anti-working
class and corrupt. The “caveats” in my writing on Venezuela that he ignores, include
my critique of Maduro – and, to a lesser extent, Chávez – for failing to seize favorable
moments to deepen the transformation process and deliver decisive blows against
corruption.[7]
Hetland would do well to take off the blinders and read
Mao’s On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People in
order to grasp the distinction between “secondary” and “antagonistic
contradictions.” In my view, the tensions between Maduro and the PCV were initially
of a “secondary” nature, and Maduro’s sectarianism contributed to the eventual
rupture, which is now clearly beyond repair.[8] The failure of analysts (and
political actors in the case of Maduro and the PCV) to appreciate the
importance of nuances and assimilate Mao’s principle on enemies and allies obstructs
serious discussion and debate. This, in turn, leads to errors and a missed
opportunity to draw invaluable lessons from more than a quarter-century of
Chavista rule.
In way of summary, the errors and shortcomings of the
Maduro government cannot be pushed under the carpet or justified, but they
nevertheless must be understood in context. That is because there is a direct
correlation between the intensity of imperialist aggression and the ability of
a government committed to real change to achieve its social, political and
economic goals. Chávez recognized early in his rule that forging alliances with
business sectors was necessary to offset the aggression waged by both domestic
and foreign adversaries. What should have been clear to everyone within the
movement was that such alliances were conducive to corruption and would generate
pressure from allies to halt or reverse the process of change.
Since then, criticism that identifies the downsides of
the policies of the Venezuelan government and defines political opportunities has
been essential. But critics need to appreciate the fact that the challenges
faced by Maduro are in many ways greater than those Chávez encountered, at
least in the years following the regime change attempts of 2002-2003. These
included the plummeting of oil prices beginning in 2015, Obama’s 2015 executive
order that signaled an escalation of hostility from Washington, and the erosion
of public enthusiasm which inevitably occurs in prolonged periods of sacrifices
and hardship. Within this context serious errors were committed. But, due to
the extreme polarization that has characterized the Chavista period including
the Chávez presidencies, the struggle to rectify the errors had to come from
within the movement, that is, from the governing party and its allies. This
would not have necessarily been the case in a more relaxed political
environment. Any frontal, unqualified attack on the government from a leftist
perspective, particularly one that fails to grasp the severity of the current
challenges, will ultimately be counterproductive.
*This
article was originally posted by Links: International Journal of Socialist
Renewal.
Endnotes:
[[1]] Trump’s
National Security Advisor, John Bolton, in his The Room Where it Happened: A
White House Memoir, hinted at the fact that the U.S. was behind the drone
attack. Bolton wrote that after the incident, “Trump said to me emphatically…
‘Get it done…This is the fifth time I’ve asked for it.’” https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2022/07/14/trump-john-bolton-coup-venezuela/
[[2]] Among the relatively recent
books that document the Washington-engineered war on Venezuela are: Joe
Emersberger and Justin Podur, Extraordinary Threat: The U.S. Empire, the
Media, and Twenty Years of Coup Attempts in Venezuela (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 2021); Anya Parampil, Corporate Coup: Venezuela and the End of
US Empire (New York: OR Books, 2024); Timothy M. Gill, Encountering US
Empire in Socialist Venezuela: The Legacy of Race, Neocolonialism and Democracy
Promotion (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2022); Alan MacLeod,
Bad News from Venezuela: Twenty Years of Fake News and Misreporting (New
York, Routledge: 2018).
[[3]] The
trade journals clearly indicated that the August 2017 executive order
“targeted” the Venezuelan oil industry. That same year, The Economist
pointed out that the oil sector had “suffered from disinvestment” and
predicted that the Maduro administration would not remain in power beyond 2019.
At the time, Hetland himself recognized the devastating impact of Washington’s
measures on the Venezuelan economy. He wrote: “Beyond supporting the hardline
opposition, U.S. actions have directly exacerbated Venezuela's crisis. The
United States has pressured American and European banks to avoid business
with Venezuela, starving Venezuela of needed funds...
U.S. sanctions (increasingly supported by other countries) have also
exacerbated the crisis.” The issue of the adverse effects of Washington’s
actions against Venezuela between Obama’s 2015 executive order – which declared
Venezuela a “threat” to U.S. national security – and the August 2017 order is
important.
The standard position
of the Venezuelan right, supported
by analysts including some on the left, is that the country’s economic crisis
preceded the main U.S. sanction which was issued in January 2019 and was
designed to cripple Venezuelan oil exports. This claim lets the U.S. off the
hook for the hardship inflicted on the Venezuelan people and blames it entirely
on Maduro’s misguided policies and corruption. Yet even John Bolton
admitted that the U.S. sanctions under Trump were aimed at “driving the
state-owned oil monopoly’s production as low as possible,” in an attempt “to
crash Maduro’s regime.” Hetland, “The Promise and Perils of Radical Left
Populism: The Case of Venezuela.” Journal of World Systems Research. Vol
24, no. 2, 2018, p. 289; The Economist Intelligence Unit, “Country Forecast
Venezuela November 2017 Updater. Country Forecast, Venezuela.” New York, November, 2017.
[[4]] Steve
Ellner, “Objective Conditions in Venezuela: Maduro’s Defensive Strategy and
Contradictions Among the People.” Science and Society, vol. 87, no. 3,
p. 389.
[[5]] Chris Gilbert, Commune or
Nothing! Venezuela’s Communal Movement and its Socialist Project (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 2023), pp. 126-139.
[[6]] Ellner, “Maduro and Machado
Play Hardball.” NACLA: Report on the
Americas, Spring, 2024, pp. 9, 11.
[[7]]
Ellner, “Class Strategies in Chavista Venezuela: Pragmatic and Populist
Policies in a Broader Context,” in Ellner (ed.), Latin America’s Pink Tide:
Breakthroughs and Shortcomings (Lanhan, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2020),
pp. 180-184.


