Global North Leftists Who Assume Purist Stands to Bash Anti-imperialist Governments of the Global South
Steve Ellner is an Associate Managing Editor of Latin
American Perspectives and a retired professor of the Universidad de
Oriente in Venezuela. He has recently written a series of articles in Monthly Review, Science and Society and Latin American Perspectives arguing
in favour of the left prioritising the struggle against US imperialism. In this
broad-ranging interview with Federico Fuentes for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal,
Ellner lays out his views on anti-US imperialism, how this should factor into
the left’s appraisal of China and Latin America’s Pink Tide governments, and
what this means for international solidarity activists.
Fuentes: In recent articles, you say the
left needs to prioritise the struggle against US imperialism. Why is this the
case?
Ellner: The basic
contradiction of capitalism is at the point of production, the contradiction
between the interests of the working class and those of capitalists. That is
fundamental to Marxism. But any analysis at the world level of the relations
between nations has to place US imperialism (including NATO) at the centre. In
my articles, I question the thesis on the left that there is a convergence of
China and the US as imperialist powers.
Fuentes: The debate regarding China often
centres on how one defines imperialism. How do you define imperialism? Is US
imperialism the only imperialism that exists?
Ellner: John Bellamy Foster points
out that [Vladimir] Lenin explained imperialism as “ multifaceted”. I would add that it has two
basic heads: the political-military element and the economic one. On that
basis, Foster questions the validity of two opposite interpretations of
imperialism.
One tendency is to equate imperialism with the
political domination of the US empire, backed of course by military power,
which was the view put forward by Leo Panitch and Sam
Gindin. They overestimated Washington’s political ability to preserve order
and stability in accordance with US economic interests. Of course, what they
wrote over a decade ago appeared to be more accurate at the time than today,
given declining US prestige and global economic instability.
At the other extreme are those left theorists who
focus on the dominance of global capital and minimise the importance of the
nation-state. They view progressive governments in Latin America as incapable
of defying global capital, and Washington as the custodians of transnational
capital, rather than as a defender of a range of interests, including US
geopolitical and economic interests. The prime example of US economic interests
is defence of the hegemony of the dollar. Paradoxically, a prime example of the
geopolitical factor is weaponising the dollar in the form of sanctions, which
induces nations to create mechanisms to sidestep the dollar for international
transactions. The end result is the weakening of the dollar as an international
currency, which is exactly what is happening.
I argue that this position, which mainly focuses on
transnational capital, is somewhat misleading. In my exchange with William Robinson in Latin
American Perspectives, I noted the importance of his work on transnational
capital and globalisation, which I have long admired, and its political
implications today. Robinson takes issue
with my reference to territorial-based imperialism, saying Lenin’s theory of
imperialism is “class-based”. But it is both. I am not saying that Lenin’s
concept of imperialism is applicable today in all its aspects, but I disagree
with Robinson’s denial of the territorial aspect of imperialism, both in
Lenin’s writings and today, for various reasons.
First, in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of
Capitalism, Lenin attributes World War I to the clash between European
superpowers in dividing up territories now known as the Global South. What
could be more territorially based than that? Second, there is a whole body of
Marxist literature — [Antonio] Gramsci, [Louis] Althusser and [Nico] Poulantzas
being the most important theoreticians — that questions the simplistic notion
that the state consists of the dominant class, namely the capitalist class or
dominant fraction of it, dominating and determining everything else. The
interests of transnational capital do not trump everything else because the
state is not the exclusive instrument of any one class fraction. In addition,
the cause-and-effect relationship of structure and superstructure is
complex, a la Althusser. That is to say, the economic
interests of the transnational class do not override political, geopolitical
and military considerations, which sometimes collide in the short run with
economic interests.
In the long run, of course, economics and geopolitics
are intricately linked, if not inseparable. Robinson and others address
geopolitics, but they do not assign it the weight it deserves. In effect,
transnational capital subsumes other key factors, such as their discussion of
BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa]. If geopolitics is not
relegated to a superficial superstructure but considered a basic element of
imperialism, then China cannot be thrown in the same category as US imperialism.
How can you place the US, with its 750 overseas military bases, in the same
general category as China, which has one? Washington’s military deployment
throughout the world, its use of sanctions and its justification for
interventionism on the basis of R2P [right to protect] or “humanitarian
interventionism” have no equivalent in Beijing’s relations with the rest of the
world and the South in particular.
Fuentes: How do you reconcile your
position on the need to prioritise US imperialism with the US’ declining global
influence and China’s concurrent rise?
Ellner: Marxists agree
that everything is in flux, and that is the case with US world hegemony. But
[Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels also polemicised against the utopian
socialists of their day, whose futuristic visions blinded them to the
reality of the present. In essence, Marx and Engels said you cannot impose the
future on the present. Thus from a Marxist perspective there are two
components: the dialectics which analyses the transformations embodied in the
present that cast light on the future; and the importance of timing, which
means there is a right time and place for everything.
With regard to US influence, sure it is in decline.
But the US is hardly a paper tiger. The Gaza conflict symbolises this reality.
The US and its proxy, Israel, have not achieved a military victory in Gaza in
spite of the billions of dollars invested in the conflict. You might draw the
conclusion that Gaza is more evidence of US decline, just like Vietnam and
Afghanistan. But look at all the destruction in human lives, personal traumas
and property. There is no need to go into detail about how US power in its
military expression, as well as its regime change capacity and use of economic
blackmail, have such a potent and destructive impact. There is no qualitative
comparison with other superpowers, the Ukrainian conflict notwithstanding. And
it is misleading to say “the Chinese are almost there” and will soon be just as
imperialist as the US. This may eventually happen, but it is not a foregone
conclusion.
Fuentes: I believe you raised this issue
of not mixing the future and the present in your recent articles…
Ellner: Yes, I did, and
in different contexts. First, with regard to writers who are jumping the gun
by overstating the importance of
the transnational state. The transnational state is not displacing the
nation-state, even while the nation-state has lost much of the fiscal leverage
it had during the years in which Keynesian economics was in vogue. It has not
lost its military capacity, which the transnational state nearly completely
lacks. Extrapolation into the distant future is no substitute for analysis of
the here and now.
An example of the global focus which plays down the
nation-state is Immanuel Wallerstein’s theory that the 1968 counter-hegemonic
movements from Columbia University to Mexico City and Czechoslovakia were what
he called a “ single revolution”, in which local
conditions were not fundamental explanatory factors. In reality, 1968 was
hardly a world revolution, and in all three cases local conditions were the
main drivers. One thing is the “demonstration effect”, whereby revolutionary
events in one country influence politics in another country. But this is quite
different from a simultaneous world revolution. Here, Wallerstein was “jumping
the gun”, in that a futuristic vision of world revolution was imposed on the
present.
Second, the same tendency of imposing the future on
the present can be seen with those who view Pink Tide governments
through the lenses of Gramsci’s theory of passive revolution and
conclude that they have betrayed their movements’ original goals. These writers
claim that what they call the Pink Tide’s “project” condemns those nations to a
return to the oppressive social relations of the past. It may well be that Pink
Tide alliances with certain business sectors that opposed regime change
attempts supported by other business sectors may end up allowing a fifth column
to penetrate and take complete control of those governments. But, as I argue
in my Monthly Review article,
what is going on in these countries is highly dynamic, making the future of
Pink Tide governments hard to predict. For instance, the degree to which US
imperialism suffers major blows will leave Pink Tide governments in a better
position to move in the opposite direction, the direction of socialism.
In this sense, the state in Pink Tide countries is
more like a battleground, as
Poulantzas described, than a dual state process in
which the new state displaces the old state or the old state eradicates the
fledgling new state. For Marta Harnecker, both
processes — the battleground of the old state and the dual state phenomenon
— took
place simultaneously under Chávez. In any case, this complexity is
misrepresented by the determinism displayed by passive revolution writers, who
argue that with governments coopting social movement leaders and granting
concessions to business interests, the bleak future of the Pink Tide is
inescapable.
Finally, the debate over the multipolar world slogan
also involves the issue of the present and the future. Those on the left who
question the progressive content of the slogan tend to conflate the two. In the
future, a multipolar world may well lead to the kind of inter-imperialist
rivalry that led the way to World War I. But we are in the present, not the
future. In the present, the multipolar world is designed to counter US hegemony
and US imperialism, which is without equal anywhere in the world.
Fuentes: Given all this, what are the
ramifications for the US left of prioritising the struggle against US
imperialism? Why should the left focus on foreign policy issues, as you argue,
when workers are often more concerned with domestic politics?
Ellner: Even in the
sphere of US domestic politics, there are pragmatic reasons why the left needs
to place greater emphasis on imperialism. The distinguishing features that
separate “liberals” or centre-leftists from the left are issues related to
foreign policy.
Take Bernie Sanders, for example, who I would label a
liberal or centre-leftist. Following Israel’s invasion of Gaza, Sanders at
first refused to call for a ceasefire, then only called for a “pause” in the
fighting. As a result, he came under heavy attack from progressives and the
Arab-American community. When Sanders entered the 2016 presidential race (if
not earlier), he made a conscious decision to downplay foreign policy and
instead stress domestic issues. He also chose to be very circumspect about what
he said about US adversaries such as [the late Venezuelan president] Hugo
Chávez and Cuba. This was not because he was less interested in foreign policy
or has limited knowledge about those issues. Rather, as a veteran politician,
he knew where the ruling class draws the line on what can be tolerated. The
fact a politician such as Sanders, who calls himself a socialist and advocates
fairly important pro-working-class reforms but is not anti-imperialist, was not
ostracised or demonised is telling. It shows the ruling class prioritises
imperialism over strictly economic demands; that it is more inclined to declare
war on anti-imperialists than those who call themselves socialists.
Anti-imperialism is one effective way to drive a wedge
between the Democratic Party machine and large sectors of the party who are
progressive but vote for Democratic candidates as a lesser of two evils. This
tendency is a major obstacle for the US left in its efforts to build an
independent progressive movement. Many people reason: “I can’t vote for a
third-party candidate because the danger that the right — and now with [Donald]
Trump the far-right — will control the White House is too daunting.” They are
right to an extent. The Democratic Party is better than the Republican Party on
domestic issues, though some on the left deny this. Trump lowered corporate
taxes from 35% to 21% and he screams “drill, baby drill” as a panacea to the
energy crisis. The Republicans are vehemently anti-union, favour capital
punishment and want to criminalise abortion. That is why it is so hard to
convince voters to support third-party candidates who address their real needs.
But foreign policy is a different story. There may be
differences between the two major parties at a given moment (Trump is slightly
better on Ukraine than [Kamala] Harris, at least rhetorically), but as a whole
both parties are equally bad. That is exactly why the Democratic Party, and
liberals in general including the liberal media, shy away from foreign policy
issues. If you listened to the Democratic Party convention in August, at best
2% of the speeches by speakers referred to foreign policy. And that 2% focused
on the bogus issue of the need to defend US national security. The two decent
things that President [Barack] Obama did — the thaw in relations with Cuba and
the Iran nuclear deal — were dropped by [Joe] Biden, with no references to them
at the convention. The discourse at the convention may have had an element of
rationality with regard to values, and some issues of substance such as ethnic
diversity, reproductive rights, etc, certainly in contrast to the Republicans,
but when it comes to foreign policy it is completely irrational. The
cornerstone of its narrative on the need to intervene abroad is national
security. Yet there is no country in the world that threatens the US,
militarily or otherwise.
The left’s message has to stress that you cannot have
both guns and butter, and that the Pentagon is the number one polluter on the
planet. We have to devise slogans that demand politicians (including liberal
ones) and the corporate media address these issues.
Another reason why anti-imperialism needs to be
emphasised is that it provides progressive governments in the Global South with
breathing space. This allows them the chance to move forward with their
progressive agenda in a democratic setting, and to deepen their nation’s
democracy. In the case of Venezuela, such breathing space may have changed the
course of events at a time when US aggression had a devastating effect and
limited the government’s options. From Cuba and Venezuela to the Soviet Union,
the Pentagon’s strategy has always been to force adversary governments to
allocate immense resources to their armed forces in order to undermine their
consumer economy, knowing full well that no country can match the US on the
military front.
Fuentes: Does prioritising anti-US
imperialism mean the left should turn a blind eye to the shortcomings of
governments under attack from US imperialism?
Ellner: No, they should
not. Some on the left say otherwise. They say the left in the Global North
should not criticise progressive Global South governments and that its sole
duty or role is to oppose imperialist intervention. But criticism of errors is
essential and nobody can, or should, question the right of anybody to formulate
criticisms. However, those who are critical need to seriously consider the
knotty issue of how and when to criticise anti-imperialist governments or other
governments under attack from US imperialism.
Take, for instance, Hamas’ actions on October 7 and
Israel’s subsequent invasion of Gaza. The pro-Palestinian solidarity movement
is divided between activists who disagree with Hamas’ incursion and others who
defend it on grounds of the right to resist. Those in the first category face a
dilemma. They have a legitimate position, which those in the second category
should respect in the name of unity. But it would be damaging to the cause, for
example, to criticise October 7 at a rally protesting Israel’s genocide in
Gaza. Referencing October 7, albeit passingly, would dampen the enthusiasm of
protesters. There are other reasons why the solidarity movement may want to
avoid any passing reference to October 7. Doing so may run the risk of playing
into Israel’s hands by implying that both sides are equally responsible for a
conflict that has brought such immense suffering to the Palestinian people.
Another reason is that passing references can simplify and decontextualise
Hamas’ decision and the strategy behind it.
One way to look at it is to consider that freedom of
speech is not an absolute principle — it depends on the circumstances. In
certain situations, such as wartime, there are limitations. The same can be
applied to strategic decisions by solidarity activists regarding criticisms of
the governments they are defending.
Fuentes: What about a country such as
Venezuela, which is not engaged in a military war with US imperialism and where
there are clearly different approaches towards its government on the left?
Ellner: Venezuela has
been in a war-type situation for many years. Prior to Chávez, no Venezuelan
economist would have imagined that if the country could not export oil the
government would survive for more than a week. That is exactly what the
sanctions are all about. On top of that you have had assassination attempts
against the president, months of violent regime-change disturbances, an
invasion by mercenaries from Colombia, an attempted coup, and abundant evidence
of sabotage, including through cybernetics — the latest documented in Anya
Parampil’s book Corporate Coup.
These were all engineered or actively supported by the US. The coup attempt in April 2019,
for instance, went hand in hand with the Trump administration’s explicit call
on the Venezuelan military to overthrow Maduro.
Some left analysts fault Maduro for taking off the
gloves and not abiding by the norms of liberal democracy. In some cases, the
criticisms are valid but they have to be contextualised. Furthermore, how
liberal is US democracy? And the US is hardly being threatened by a foreign
power, the ludicrous Russiagate scandal notwithstanding.
Fuentes: The issue is that often
criticisms are seen as “aiding” US imperialism’s campaign against Venezuela.
Are there no limits when it comes to muting criticisms?
Ellner: You have to draw
a line in the sand. Electoral fraud, for instance, is unacceptable.
Furthermore, no criticism should be vetoed, it is just a question of context;
that is, under what circumstances do you formulate the criticism. In addition,
we have to recognise that certain situations constitute grey areas in which
left analysts cannot be certain of all the facts. In those cases we can only
make educated guesses and need to recognise there are important gaps in what we
know that cannot be easily filled. The left has to make an effort to define
these grey areas to distinguish what we know for certain.
For instance, after the first sanctions were imposed
on Venezuela with the Obama executive order in early 2015, and then scaled up
by the Trump administration which called for a military coup, one grey area was
the Venezuelan military. There was no way for an analyst who lacked inside
information to really know what options Maduro had. The calls for a military
coup by the world’s foremost military power undoubtedly strengthened the hands
of Diosdado Cabello, the number two man who has close ties with the military
and does not have Maduro’s leftist background. It is easy to say Maduro should
have responded to the threats by radicalising the process, which is what
several Venezuelan Trotskyist parties advocated. Maduro went in the opposite
direction by making concessions to the private sector. As a result, he
lost the backing of the Communist Party of Venezuela.
There were some on the Venezuelan left who told me at
the time that the Chavistas should have given up power so as not to be
identified with the terrible economic conditions resulting from US sanctions.
That position underestimates the importance of state power. Lenin recognised
this. What would history have been like had Lenin relinquished power in
response to the extreme hardships caused during the period of War Communism?
Fuentes: But what if, in the name of
holding onto state power, electoral fraud is committed? How should the left
deal with this?
Ellner: As I said above,
electoral fraud needs to be ruled out, and for various reasons not just ethical
ones. But in the case of Venezuela there are complex issues. Those who claim
that fraud was committed on July 28 need to factor them into their analysis.
For example, a victory for the opposition would most
likely have resulted in a bloodbath against the Chavistas and others as well.
The candidacy of Edmundo González was deceptive because he was a mere puppet;
the real candidate was María Corina Machado. Some analysts pointed to
González’s conciliatory tone, but he was not and is not calling the shots —
everybody knows that. If you look at Machado’s statements over the years, you
will see her plan was to “neutralise” Chavismo, a euphemism for Pinochet-style repression
that goes beyond the organised left.
Recognising how formidable the challenges facing the
Chavista leadership are can help break down the divide between those on the
left who claim fraud was committed and those who do not. One key question is
the following: is there a significant area of convergence — or unity — taking
in those who validate the official results of July 28 and those who question
them. I believe that, as tenuous as that coexistence may be, there is a
potential that needs to be encouraged.
Several factors would bolster such a relationship.
First, recognising that the violence and destabilisation following the July 28
elections was in large part undertaken or promoted by organised domestic and
external political actors, as the Maduro government has documented in some detail. Second,
questioning the official results should not imply accepting the results
announced by Machado-González. Discrepancies in their statements regarding the
number of voter tally sheets in their possession and the total lack of transparency
in the opposition’s presidential primaries last October are just two of many
reasons why their pronouncements should not be taken at face value. And third,
a convergence of Maduro supporters and left critics should be based on
recognising certain positive features of his government. His foreign policy
tops the list, but there is more. As harsh as the criticisms of his domestic
policies may be, the claim that Maduro is a bona fide neoliberal
is untenable. Left critics point to the government’s failure to fulfil Chávez’s
plea of “ Commune or nothing.”
Nevertheless, the government has provided the communes with a degree of
support, in the context of a rank-and-file impetus. Its record on this front is
mixed, but it has positive aspects, as Chris Gilbert points out in his recent book on the subject.
I am not saying the issue of the July 28 elections
should be swept under the rug or placed on the back burner. But the discussion
should not get in the way of the larger issue, which is US imperialism and
recognising that the Maduro government’s errors have to be contextualised. Its
errors, to a large degree, are erroneous reactions to US imperialism. That,
however, is not to minimise the gravity of the errors or to absolve leaders of
responsibility for committing them.
Fuentes: Where does this leave us more
generally? There will always be certain issues that we cannot be too sure of.
Does this mean we can throw certain issues into the too-hard basket?
Ellner: I am certainly
not proposing a post-modernist philosophy, or that there are many truths. No,
there is only one truth and we should strive to know what it is. But at the
same time, we should attempt to determine grey areas, where we recognise we
cannot come up with definitive conclusions because not all the facts are clear.
In situations like this, we should be especially tolerant of opposing views on
the left. This is what Mao called “the
correct handling of contradictions among the people.”
I am also not saying that July 28 is one of those
“grey areas”. But I am saying that much of what led up to July 28 consists of
grey areas. One example that I gave was the situation within the Venezuelan
armed forces, which may have limited Maduro’s options. For this reason, I am in
favour of greater tolerance between pro-Maduro Chavistas and many of their left
critics — as difficult as that may be.
Fuentes: Does prioritising US imperialism
mean we cannot extend solidarity to, for example, workers striking against
Brazilian and Chinese capitalists, to pick two examples of governments in
conflict with US imperialism?
Ellner: Certainly not.
The left needs to support workers’ struggles against companies owned by
Brazilian and Chinese capitalists, or those of anywhere else for that matter.
That is a dimension no one on the left can downplay.
But its importance should not eclipse the geopolitical
dimension. The importance of geopolitics is underrated by those who accuse
solidarity activists of being “ campist” or belonging to
the “ Manichean left,” an
unfortunate term used by Robinson in a recent article, and which I take up
in the Science and Society symposium.
Robinson invokes the term to refer to honest revolutionaries, such as Vijay Prashad, simply
because they praise the Chinese leadership. In doing so, Robinson fails to
underscore basic distinctions between the Chinese state, state capital and
political leaders, on the one hand, and Chinese private capital on the other.
In the same breath, he slams solidarity activists such as CODEPINK,
even though that organisation is rather neutral on the internal politics of
other countries. Leftists, and solidarity activists in particular, have the
right to prioritise anti-US imperialism without being accused of Manichaeism.
The use of the term should be left to the McCarthyites on the right.
Similarly, the term “campist” is applied to leftists
who supposedly reduce all conflicts to the clash between US imperialism and its
adversaries, specifically Russia and China, and prioritise the struggle against
US imperialism. It is assumed that they are blind to exploitation by
capitalists who are outside of the US camp and that they blindly support all US
adversaries.
Take the case of the Ukrainian conflict. Few leftists
defend Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine, but most leftists do not align themselves with Ukraine’s side in
the conflict. One exception is Howie
Hawkins, the Green Party’s presidential candidate in 2020, who used the
term “campist” to criticise a recent statement arguing that NATO provoked
Russia into invading Ukraine. Hawkins makes the accusation without
indicating whether or not the authors of the statement defend [Vladimir]
Putin’s decision to invade. A big chunk of the anti-war movement does not
approve of Russia’s invasion, and even suggests territorial ambitions are at
play, but believes
NATO deserves the greater part of the blame. That position may be open to
debate, but it is a far cry from being “campist” or located in the pro-Russian
camp.
Hawkins takes issue with “partisans of states” that
challenge Western dominance and support multipolarity, claiming they see China
as leading the way. The pro-China “campist” category assumes that Cold War II
is a rerun of Cold War I, when Communist parties were aligned with, and loyal
to, the Soviet Union. But Chinese Communist leaders, unlike those of the old
Soviet Union, are not for the most part exporting any model. And not many on
the left defend the Chinese model per se. Those who praise China are mainly
praising its foreign policy, which is based on the principle of defence of
national sovereignty. Talk of “campism” is a throwback to the Cold War when
leftists were told they had to balance criticism of US policy with criticism of
the Soviet Union. The price you paid for refusing was getting called a “fellow
traveller,” at best.
That said, there are people and groups on the left who
align with China, not only because of Beijing’s foreign policy, but because
they are attracted to the Chinese model. We have to take off the blinders
to objectively
analyse the Chinese case. I am not an expert on the subject, but I know
enough to say that what
is happening in China is as important for the left to analyse as it is
complex. Attacking China supporters through the use of shibboleths reminiscent
of the old Cold War gets in the way of much-needed, open and honest debate.
Fuentes: There can be a problem though
when prioritising US imperialism leads to a kind of “lesser evil” politics in
which genuine democratic and worker struggles are not just underrated, but
directly opposed on the basis that they weaken the struggle against US imperialism.
Is there ever a case when geopolitics should trump solidarity and the rights of
others in struggle?
Ellner: No. One does not
negate the other. But the issue you raise can be viewed from a broader
perspective. The organised left in the Global North is divided in three
categories. Some leftist activists form part of the anti-imperialist movement;
others, who identify as orthodox Marxists, prioritise the working class; and
others are social movement activists involved in struggles around racism,
immigration, reproductive rights, LGBTQ+ issues, etc. The banners of all three
reinforce one another, as intersectionality brings together different oppressed
groups.
At the same time, there are discrepancies and tensions
between these activists. This is natural and inevitable. If the post-Marxists
and post-modernists are correct about one thing, it is that social and
political movements for change in contemporary society are more complex, at
least on the surface, than was the case 100 years ago. That said, there is much
room for debate to determine priorities and strategies. For example, a number
of articles in Jacobin criticise
the identity politics of some social movements for viewing class as just one
more identity. Another example is the works of the Italian Communist Domenico Losurdo,
who viewed anti-imperialism as the main driver of leftist advances beginning in
1917.
In my recent articles, I
take issue with anti-Pink Tide writers who see worker and social
movement mobilisations as practically the only driver of progressive change,
while leaving anti-imperialist governments largely out of the picture. But my
articles also call into question the validity of an exclusively geopolitical
focus. We are not quite in a situation like World War II, when Communists
promoted a no-strike policy for the labour movement. The exclusively
geopolitical focus falls short in many situations. For instance, it may justify
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, without considering political options available
to Russia as a response to NATO expansion and threats. Also, the logic behind
the exclusively geopolitical focus is to place [former Iraqi leader] Saddam
Hussein in the same anti-imperialist category as Chávez, since both were
subject to Washington's regime-change schemes, without considering domestic
factors that clearly differentiated the two.
My main point is on the need to be realistic. Much
open discussion is needed and should be welcomed. But we are not going to
arrive at a blueprint or even a synthesis because societal contradictions are
just too profound. We can, however, aim for common denominators based on common
assumptions.
One of those assumptions is that anti-US imperialism
has to be prioritised, though of course not as the only priority. Take the
debate around BRICS and the banner of a multipolar world. Some leftists
recognise the importance of BRICS in undermining Washington’s weaponisation of
the dollar in the form of sanctions against Cuba, Venezuela, etc, while
questioning the goal of multipolarity as a long-term strategy. Maduro and many
of his staunch defenders see it as a fundamental tool in advancing toward socialism.
Those are differences that we can live with. But I do not see any easy
reconciliation with those who completely deny the importance of the multipolar
world slogan and who lash out at the Maduro government for being a
pro-neoliberal sellout. These writers tend to argue that US imperialism is not
the only bully on the block. This may be the case, but it is certainly by far
the most dangerous one.
Fuentes: This discussion has been quite
clarifying. Is there anything else you would like to add?
Ellner: Sure. Certain
policies and actions by anti-imperialist governments and movements in the
Global South are unprincipled or blatantly incorrect and need to be criticised
in no uncertain terms. Others are less black and white and involve complex
issues. With regard to the second category, the left should not overemphasise
criticisms; it needs to contextualise them and should be careful as to when and
how such criticisms are formulated. Distinguishing between the two categories
requires serious consideration. The use of simplistic terms such as “Manichean
left” and “campist” impedes much-needed objective analysis and belies the
complexity of what probably will be a relatively long path of socialist
transition.
Steve would like to thank Andrew Smolski
for his useful insights regarding the issues raised in this interview.
posted by Steve Ellner @ 4:14 PM
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