La Política Inconsistente de Trump hacia América Latina

                       Congresistas Carlos A. Giménez, Mario Díaz-Balart, María Elvira Salazar 

              por Steve Ellner

Publicado en ingles por NACLA: Report on the Americas

Durante su primer mandato, el presidente Donald Trump llevó a cabo una campaña de "máxima presión" contra los supuestos adversarios de Estados Unidos en América Latina y otras regiones. Entre sus medidas de línea dura, impuso severas sanciones a Venezuela—lo que irónicamente, provocó un éxodo masivo de venezolanos hacia Estados Unidos—y revirtió el acercamiento del expresidente Barack Obama con Cuba.

Pero ¿Qué tan comprometido está Trump en combatir el comunismo en América Latina en este momento—es decir, en Venezuela, Cuba y Nicaragua? La respuesta sigue siendo incierta.

Sus recientes amenazas contra Panamá, Canadá y Groenlandia, así como su enfrentamiento con el presidente ucraniano Volodymyr Zelensky, han desviado la atención de los "verdaderos enemigos ", según la retórica habitual de Washington. En este contexto, las acciones de política exterior de Trump en los primeros dos meses de su segundo mandato contrastan con su primera administración, cuando el “cambio de régimen” era el objetivo inequívoco.

En su discurso del 4 de marzo ante la Sesión Conjunta del Congreso, Trump no mencionó a Nicolás Maduro, Miguel Díaz-Canel ni Daniel Ortega, marcando una diferencia con su retórica anterior.

Incluso no está claro si contará nuevamente con las sanciones internacionales, como lo hizo con Venezuela y Cuba en su primer mandato. Ha indicado que el uso de "aranceles como castigo" podría ser una alternativa preferible, ya que, según una fuente cercana, el presidente "teme que las sanciones internacionales alejen a los países del dólar estadounidense".

A diferencia de sus firmes posturas en temas como inmigración, derechos de las personas trans y la política fiscal, su enfoque hacia América Latina está marcada por vacilaciones e incertidumbre, reflejo de su creciente uso de tácticas transaccionales en política exterior. Los anticomunistas de línea dura tanto dentro como fuera del Partido Republicano no ven esto con buenos ojos.

El Péndulo Venezolano

Un claro ejemplo de esta inconsistencia es Venezuela. La oposición liderada por María Corina Machado tenía razones para ser optimista tras la victoria de Trump en noviembre y su designación de Marco Rubio, un halcón en temas latinoamericanos, como Secretario de Estado.

"Tristemente, Venezuela está gobernada por una organización narcotraficante", declaró Rubio en su audiencia de confirmación, donde fue ratificado por unanimidad. Luego criticó la administración Biden por haber sido “engañada" al negociar con Maduro a finales de 2022 y otorga una licencia a Chevron, la cual está "proporcionando miles de millones de dólares a las arcas del régimen". También emitió una advertencia ominosa sobre Cuba: "La hora de la verdad está llegando, Cuba literalmente se está derrumbando".

Los acontecimientos en Siria alentaron aún más a la derecha venezolana. Apenas unos días antes de la toma de posesión de Trump, Machado declaró al Financial Times: “¿No creen que [los generales que apoyan a Maduro] se miran al espejo y ven a los generales que Assad dejó atrás?”

Sin embargo, todo cambió con el encuentro amistoso entre el enviado de Trump para misiones especiales, Richard Grenell, y Maduro en Caracas a finales de enero. En esa reunión, Maduro acordó liberar a seis prisioneros estadounidenses y facilitar el retorno de inmigrantes venezolanos desde Estados Unidos. Días después, se permitió la renovación de la licencia otorgada por Biden a Chevron para la explotación de petróleo venezolano, lo que representa una cuarta parte de la producción total de crudo del país. Al mismo tiempo Grenell afirmó que Trump “no busca cambios en el régimen [de Maduro]”.

Para empeorar aún más la situación, el Departamento de Seguridad Nacional (Homeland Security) anunció la cancelación de la extensión del Estatus de Protección Temporal (TPS) otorgada por Biden a más de 300,000 inmigrantes venezolanos, argumentando que había “mejoras significativas en áreas como la economía, la salud pública y el crimen que permiten el regreso seguro de estos ciudadanos a su país de origen”.

Estos giros no fueron bien recibidos por los sectores más radicales de Miami y la oposición venezolana. El notorio periodista del Miami Herald, Andrés Oppenheimer, lo expresó con contundencia: “El apretón de manos entre Grenell y Maduro cayó como un balde de agua fría para muchos sectores de la oposición venezolana… y representó una legitimación del gobierno de Maduro”. Añadió que, aunque el gobierno de Trump negó haber alcanzado un acuerdo con Maduro, “se han levantado muchas sospechas, y estas no se disiparán hasta que Trump aclare la situación”.

Tras el viaje de Grenell a Venezuela, el tema de la renovación de la licencia de Chevron tomó un giro inesperado. En una videoconferencia el 26 de febrero, Donald Trump Jr. le comentó a María Corina Machado que, apenas una hora antes, su padre había tuiteado que la licencia de Chevron sería descontinuada. Tras una carcajada, Machado, visiblemente complacida, le dirigió unas palabras a Trump Sr.: “Mire, Señor Presidente, Venezuela es la mayor oportunidad en este continente para usted, para el pueblo estadounidense y para todo nuestro continente”. Machado parecía intentar replicar el acuerdo entre Zelensky y Trump sobre los recursos minerales de Ucrania.

Mientras tanto, Mauricio Claver-Carone, enviado especial del Departamento de Estado para América Latina, le dijo a Oppenheimer que la licencia de Chevron era "permanente" y se renovaba automáticamente cada seis meses. Sin embargo, apenas una semana después, Trump cambió nuevamente su postura. Axios informó que la última decisión se debió a la presión de tres congresistas republicanos de Florida, quienes amenazaron con retener sus votos en el presupuesto presentado al congreso por Trump. Según fuentes cercanas, Trump admitió en privado: "Están enloquecidos y necesito sus votos".

Las Tensiones Internas del Trumpismo

Las amenazas de Trump a líderes mundiales siguen la estrategia descrita en su libro El arte de la negociación (1987). Para algunos de sus leales, la estrategia está funcionando a la perfección. Su enfoque puede resumirse como “atacar y negociar”. Escribió “mi estilo de negociación es bastante simple”. “Apunto muy alto, y luego sigo presionando y presionando… hasta conseguir lo que busco.”

Esto es precisamente lo que ocurrió cuando Trump anunció sus planes de “recuperar” el Canal de Panamá, lo que llevó a una empresa de Hong Kong a revelar sus intenciones de vender la operación de dos puertos panameños a un consorcio que incluye a BlackRock. No sorprende que Trump se atribuyera el acuerdo.

Un escenario similar tuvo lugar en el caso de Colombia, donde el presidente Gustavo Petro cedió en los vuelos de deportación de EE. UU. para evitar represalias comerciales. Por razones similares, la mexicana Claudia Sheinbaum desplegó 10,000 soldados en la frontera norte para frenar cruces irregulares y luego, el 6 de marzo, preguntó a Trump por teléfono: “¿Cómo podemos seguir colaborando si EE. UU. está tomando medidas que perjudican al pueblo mexicano?” En respuesta, Trump suspendió temporalmente la aplicación de aranceles del 25 por ciento a los productos mexicanos.

En El arte de la negociación, Trump se jacta de su estrategia de engaño, como cuando declaró ante la Comisión de Licencias de Nueva Jersey que estaba “más que dispuesto a retirarse de Atlantic City si el proceso regulatorio resultaba demasiado difícil o lento.” De manera similar, ha afirmado en reiteradas ocasiones que Estados Unidos no necesita el petróleo venezolano. Sin embargo, la volatilidad del mercado mundial del petróleo y la posibilidad de que otras naciones accedan a las vastas reservas de Venezuela son cuestiones de gran preocupación para Washington.

La aplicación del enfoque de El arte de la negociación a la política exterior ejemplifica la tendencia pragmática de Trump. El gobierno de Maduro y algunos sectores de la izquierda ven con buenos ojos este pragmatismo, ya que deja abierta la posibilidad de concesiones por parte de Venezuela a cambio del levantamiento de sanciones. Portavoces del gobierno venezolano, al menos públicamente, otorgan a Trump el beneficio de la duda al atribuir la anulación de la licencia de Chevron y otras decisiones adversas a la presión de la extrema derecha de Miami.

Según el Wall Street Journal varios empresarios estadounidenses que viajaron a Caracas y “se reunieron con Maduro y su círculo cercano señalaron que los venezolanos estaban convencidos de que Trump… se relacionaría con Maduro de manera similar a como lo hizo con los líderes de Corea del Norte y Rusia.”

Sin embargo, este optimismo pasa por alto las corrientes contrastantes dentro del trumpismo. Si bien las convergencias son mayores que las diferencias, las prioridades dentro del movimiento MAGA a veces chocan. Por un lado, el populismo de derecha enfatiza el tema de la inmigración, el anti-"wokismo" y la oposición a la ayuda exterior, todo diseñado para atraer apoyo más allá de la base tradicional de las clases alta y media-alta del Partido Republicano. Por otro lado, la extrema derecha convencional exige nada menos que un cambio de régimen y acciones de desestabilización contra Venezuela y Cuba (acciones que los “populistas” no se oponen). Los halcones de la extrema derecha definen a estos tres gobiernos como “izquierdistas” y, en palabras recientes de Rubio, “enemigos de la humanidad.”

La decisión de Maduro para colaborar en la repatriación de los inmigrantes venezolanos a cambio de la renovación de la licencia de Chevron ilustra las prioridades contradictorias dentro del trumpismo. Para la extrema derecha anti-izquierdista, el supuesto acuerdo fue una "traición" a los principios por parte de Washington, mientras que para los populistas de derecha fue una victoria para Trump, especialmente considerando la magnitud de la población inmigrante de Venezuela.

Del mismo modo, la reducción drástica de la ayuda exterior ha producido tensiones dentro de trumpismo. En su reciente discurso ante el Congreso, Trump denunció la asignación de 8 millones de dólares a un programa LGBTQ+ en una nación africana "de la que nadie ha oído hablar", así como otros supuestos programas progresistas. Incluso el senador de línea dura de Florida, Rick Scott, ha cuestionado la eficacia de la ayuda exterior, afirmando: "Veamos: el régimen de Castro aún controla Cuba, Venezuela acaba de robar otras elecciones, Ortega se está fortaleciendo en Nicaragua". La declaración de Scott refleja el pensamiento transaccional de Trump respecto a la oposición venezolana: demasiados dólares destinados a intentos fallidos de cambio de régimen.

En contraste, el defensor de los halcones, Oppenheimer, publicó un artículo de opinión en el Miami Herald titulado "Los recortes de Trump a ayuda exterior son una bendición para los dictadores en China, Venezuela y Cuba".

El tema de la ayuda estadounidense también ha generado enfrentamientos internos desde una fuente inesperada: la propia oposición derechista venezolana. La periodista de investigación Patricia Poleo, radicada en Miami y opositora de larga data de Hugo Chávez y Maduro, ha acusado a Juan Guaidó y a su gobierno interino de apropiarse millones, si no miles de millones, otorgados por el gobierno de EE.UU. a la oposición venezolana. Poleo, ahora ciudadana estadounidense, afirma que el FBI está investigando a Guaidó por malversación de fondos.

No se puede subestimar la influencia del componente anti-izquierdista del trumpismo. Trump se ha convertido en la principal inspiración de lo que se ha denominado la nueva "Internacional Reaccionaria", comprometida con combatir a la izquierda en todo el mundo. Además, los halcones que han manifestado interés abrumador en derrocar al gobierno de Maduro (una aspiración de los populistas de la derecha también) —incluidos Rubio, Elon Musk, Claver-Carone, y el asesor de Seguridad Nacional Michael Waltz—forman parte del círculo de asesores de Trump.

No es de extrañar que, durante la fase de luna de miel de la presidencia de Trump, una lista de deseos populista recibiera considerable atención. Sin embargo, la anexión del Canal de Panamá, Canadá y Groenlandia resulta irrealizable, al igual que la conversión de Gaza en una “Riviera de Medio Oriente”. Su esquema arancelario no se queda atrás. Además, si bien el uso de la intimidación le ha permitido obtener concesiones, la eficacia de esta táctica de negociación es limitada: las amenazas pierden fuerza cuando se repiten sin cesar. Finalmente, las promesas incumplidas de Trump de reducir los precios de los alimentos y lograr otras hazañas económicas inevitablemente aumentarán la desilusión entre sus partidarios.

Trump detesta perder y, ante la caída de su popularidad, es probable que opte por objetivos más realistas que cuentan con el respaldo bipartidista y el apoyo de los medios comerciales. En este contexto, los tres gobiernos del hemisferio percibidos como adversarios de EE.UU. se perfilan como los blancos más probables. A falta de tropas estadounidenses sobre el terreno—una medida que no contaría con respaldo popular—no puede descartar una acción militar o no militar contra Venezuela, Cuba o Nicaragua, o tal vez contra Venezuela, Cuba y Nicaragua.

 

Steve Ellner es profesor jubilado de la Universidad de Oriente en Venezuela. Actualmente es editor asociado de Latin American Perspectives. Es autor de numerosos libros, entre ellos El fenómeno Chávez: sus orígenes y su impacto hasta 2013 (2014) y La izquierda latinoamericana en el poder: Cambios y enfrentamientos en el siglo XXI (editor, publicado por CELARG y el Centro Nacional de Historia, Caracas, 2014).  https://www.dropbox.com/s/yxxsdyf0puqxdhg/La%20izquierda%20latinoamericana%20book.pdf?dl=0

 

 

Trump's Policy toward Latin America: What are the Real Goals?

First posted by NACLA: Report on the Americas

Steve Ellner

During his first term, President Donald Trump exerted a “maximum pressure” campaign against perceived U.S. adversaries in Latin America and elsewhere. Among other hardline policies, he levelled crippling sanctions against Venezuela—leading, ironically, to a mass exodus of Venezuelans to the United States—and reversed former President Barack Obama’s rapprochement with Cuba. 

But just how committed is Trump to fighting communism in Latin America at this particular moment—in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua? Today, it’s anyone’s guess. 

Trump’s recent threats against Panama, Canada, and Greenland, on top of his clash with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, take the spotlight off the “real enemies,” as usually defined by Washington. In that sense, Trump’s foreign policy actions in the first two months of his second administration are a far cry from his first, when regime change was the unmistakable goal.

In sharp contrast to the rhetoric of his first administration, in his March 4 address to the Joint Session of Congress Trump made no reference to Nicolás Maduro, Miguel Díaz-Canel, or Daniel Ortega. It’s even unclear whether Trump will pursue the use of international sanctions, which he ratcheted up against Venezuela and Cuba in his first government. So far, Trump has indicated that his use of “tariffs as punishment” may be preferable to international sanctions, which, as one insider stated, the president “worries are causing countries to move away from the U.S. dollar.”

Unlike Trump’s policies on immigration, trans rights, and taxation, his Latin American policy is plagued by vacillations and uncertainties, a sign of his deepening reliance on a transactional approach to foreign policy.  The anti-communist hardliners in and outside of the Republican party are not pleased.

The Venezuelan Pendulum

Take Venezuela as an example. The Venezuelan opposition led by María Corina Machado had all the reason to be upbeat when Trump won in November and then chose Latin America hawk Marco Rubio as Secretary of State.

“Sadly, Venezuela is governed by a narco-trafficking organization,” Rubio declared at his confirmation hearing, in which his appointment was unanimously ratified. He then said that “the Biden administration got played” when it negotiated with Maduro in late- 2022 and issued a license to Chevron, which is “providing billions of dollars into the regimes’ coffers.” With regard to Cuba, Rubio issued an ominous warning: “The moment of truth is arriving, Cuba is literally collapsing.”

Events in Syria added to the euphoria on the right. Just days before Trump’s inauguration, Machado told the Financial Times, “Don’t you think [the generals supporting Maduro] look in the mirror and see the generals which Assad left behind?”

But then came the friendly encounter between Trump’s envoy for special missions Richard Grenell and Maduro in Caracas in late January, when Maduro agreed to turn over six U.S. prisoners in Venezuela and facilitate the return of Venezuelan immigrants from the United States. Days later, the Biden-approved license with Chevron for exploiting Venezuelan oil, constituting a quarter of the nation’s total oil production, was allowed to roll over. At the same time, Grenell declared that Trump “does not want to make changes to the [Maduro] regime.”

To complicate matters further, the Department of Homeland Security announced that it would cancel Biden’s extension of Temporary Protected Status for over 300,000 Venezuelan immigrants, on grounds that “there are notable improvements in several areas such as the economy, public health, and crime that allow for these nationals to be safely returned to their home country.”

These developments did not sit well with the Miami hawks and the Venezuelan opposition. Notorious Miami Herald journalist Andres Oppenheimer put it forcefully: “The handshake of Grenell and Maduro fell like a bucket of cold water on many sectors of the Venezuelan opposition… and was like a legitimation of the Maduro government.” Oppenheimer went on to point out that although the Trump government denied it had cut a deal with Maduro, “many suspicions have been raised and will not dissipate until Trump clarifies the matter.”

After Grenell’s trip to Venezuela, the issue of the renewal of Chevron’s license took surprising twists and turns. In a video conversation on February 26, Donald Trump Jr. told María Corina Machado that just an hour before, his father had tweeted that Chevron’s license would be discontinued. Following a burst of laughter, a delighted Machado directed remarks at Trump Sr.: “Look, Mr. President, Venezuela is the biggest opportunity in this continent, for you, for the American people, and for all the people in our continent.” Machado appeared to be attempting to replicate the deal between Zelensky and Trump involving Ukraine’s mineral resources.

But simultaneously, Mauricio Claver-Carone, the State’s Department’s Special Envoy for Latin America, told Oppenheimer that the license granted Chevron was "permanent" and automatically renewed every six months. Then, just one week later, Trump reversed his position again. Axios reported that the latest decision was due to pressure from three Florida GOP House members who threatened to withhold votes for Trump’s budget deal. Trump allegedly acknowledged this privately, telling insiders: "They're going crazy and I need their votes."

Trumpism’s Internal Strains

Trump’s threats against world leaders come straight out of his 1987 book The Art of the Deal. For some loyalists, the strategy is working like magic. Trump’s approach can be summarized as “attack and negotiate.” “My style of deal-making is quite simple,” he states in the book. “I aim very high, and then I just keep pushing and pushing… to get what I’m after.”

This is precisely what happened when Trump announced plans to “reclaim” the Panama Canal, prompting a Hong Kong-based firm to reveal plans to sell the operation of two Panamanian ports to a consortium that includes BlackRock. Not surprisingly, Trump took credit for the deal.

A similar scenario played out in the case of Colombia, in which President Gustavo Petro yielded on U.S. deportation flights to avert trade retaliations. For the same reasons, Mexico’s Claudia Sheinbaum began sending 10,000 troops to the northern border to combat irregular crossings and then, on March 6, asked Trump by phone: “'How can we continue to collaborate if the U.S. is doing something that hurts the Mexican people?" In response, Trump temporarily suspended the implementation of 25 percent tariffs on Mexican goods.    

In The Art of the Deal, Trump boasts about this strategy of bluffing, such as when he told the New Jersey Licensing Commission that he was “more than willing to walk away from Atlantic City if the regulatory process proved to be too difficult or too time-consuming.” Similarly, Trump has repeatedly stated that the United States does not need Venezuelan oil. In fact, global oil volatility and the possibility that other nations will gain access to Venezuela’s vast oil reserves are matters of great concern to Washington.

The “Art of the Deal” approach to foreign policy exemplifies Trump’s pragmatic tendency. The Maduro government and some on the left welcome the pragmatism because it leaves open the possibility of concessions by Venezuela in return for the lifting of sanctions. Venezuelan government spokespeople, at least publicly, give Trump the benefit of the doubt by attributing his annulment of Chevron’s license and other adverse decisions to pressure from Miami’s far right. The Wall Street Journal reported that several U.S. businesspeople who traveled to Caracas and “met with Maduro and his inner circle say the Venezuelans were convinced that Trump would… engage with Maduro much like he had with the leaders of North Korea and Russia."

But this optimism overlooks the contrasting currents within Trumpism. Although the convergences are currently greater than the differences, priorities within the MAGA movement sometimes clash. On the one hand, right-wing populism spotlights the issue of immigration, anti-“wokism,” and opposition to foreign aid, all designed to appeal beyond the Republican Party’s traditional upper and upper-middle class base of support. On the other hand, the conventional far right calls for nothing short of regime change and destabilization actions against Venezuela and Cuba. While progressives have sharply different views on Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, the far-right hawks currently define all three governments as “leftist” and, in the recent words of Rubio, “enemies of humanity.”

Maduro’s agreement to collaborate on the repatriation of immigrants in return for the renewal of the Chevron license exemplifies the conflicting priorities within Trumpism. For the anti-left far right, the alleged deal was a “betrayal” of principles by Washington, while for the right-wing populists it was a victory for Trump, especially given the enormity of Venezuela’s immigrant population.

Another example of clashing priorities upheld by the two currents is the Trump administration’s decision to cut foreign aid programs to a bare minimum. In his recent address to Congress, Trump denounced an $8 million allotment to an LGBTQ+ program in an African nation “nobody has heard of,” and other alleged woke programs. Even Florida’s hawk senator Rick Scott has questioned the effectiveness of foreign aid, saying: “Let’s see: the Castro regime still controls Cuba, Venezuela just stole another election, Ortega is getting stronger in Nicaragua.” Scott’s statement reflects Trump’s transactional thinking regarding the Venezuelan opposition: too many dollars for regime-change attempts that turned out to be fiascos.

In contrast, hawk champion Oppenheimer published an opinion piece in the Miami Herald titled “Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts are a Boon for Dictators in China, Venezuela and Cuba.”

The issue of U.S. aid has also produced infighting from an unexpected source: within the Venezuelan right-wing opposition. Miami-based investigative journalist Patricia Poleo, a long-time opponent of Hugo Chávez and Maduro, has accused Juan Guaidó and his interim government of pocketing millions, if not billions, granted them by the U.S. government. Poleo, now a U.S. citizen, claims that the FBI is investigating Guaidó for mishandling the money. 

The influence of the anti-leftist component of Trumpism can’t be overstated. Trump has become the leading inspiration of what has been called the new “Reactionary International,” which is committed to combatting the Left around the world. Furthermore, the hawks who have expressed interest in toppling the Maduro government (which the populist current is not at all opposed to either)—including Rubio, Elon Musk, Claver-Carone, and National Security Advisor Michael Waltz—populate Trump’s circle of advisors.

It is not surprising that during the honeymoon phase of Trump’s presidency, a populist wish list would receive considerable attention. But the annexation of the Panama Canal, Canada, and Greenland is unrealizable, as is the conversion of Gaza into a Riviera of the Middle East. His tariff scheme is not far behind. Furthermore, while his use of intimidation has helped him gain concessions, the effectiveness of this bargaining tactic is limited—threats lose power when endlessly repeated. Finally, Trump’s unfulfilled promises to lower food prices and achieve other economic feats will inevitably add to the disillusionment of his supporters.

Trump loathes losing and, in the face of declining popularity, he is likely to turn to more realistic goals that can count on bipartisan support in addition to endorsement from the commercial media. In this scenario, the three governments in the hemisphere perceived to be U.S. adversaries are likely targets. Short of U.S. boots on the ground—which would not garner popular support—military or non-military action cannot be discarded against Venezuela, Cuba, or Nicaragua, or, perhaps, Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua.

Steve Ellner is a retired professor at the Universidad de Oriente in Venezuela where he lived for over 40 years. He is currently an Associate Managing Editor of Latin American Perspectives. His latest book is his co-edited Latin American Social Movements and Progressive Governments: Creative Tensions Between Resistance and Convergence. 

https://mronline.org/2025/03/17/trumps-policy-toward-latin-america-even-anti-communist-zealots-in-miami-dont-like-it/

 

Review of Global Civil War: Capitalism Post-Pandemic by William I. Robinson

 

William I. Robinson, Global Civil War: Capitalism Post-Pandemic

(Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2022), 185 pp., $17.95

Book review by Steve Ellner published in the journal “Socialism and Democracy”

 

In previous works, William Robinson, among other mostly Marxist

analysts, has written on the highly adverse and troublesome effects

of the so-called fourth industrial revolution consisting of a “new

wave of digitalization” (86) and computer technology, artificial intelligence,

platform-based industry, biotechnology, laborless production

and other technological inroads, which have thoroughly transformed

capitalism. In his new book, Robinson demonstrates with abundant

facts and examples how the Covid pandemic accelerated these developments,

which constitute the core of twenty-first century global capitalism.

One result was that inequality “reached unprecedented levels

worldwide” (84). Indeed, what Naomi Klein called the “shock doctrine”

played out during the pandemic beginning in 2020, when

Rahm Emanuel commented “never let a crisis go to waste” (37),

thanks to trillions in bailout money allocated to big capital. Robinson

debunks the “fairy-tale” arguments of the mainstream champions of

the fourth industrial revolution who ignore its negative, if not nefarious,

impact and see it as “ushering [in] a new age of prosperity,

democracy and abundance for all” (85).

 

Robinson refers to Marx’s thesis linking technological development

and systemic change – what some misleadingly call “technological

determinism.” Marx famously wrote that the windmill was to

feudalism what the steam engine was to industrial capitalism. While

Marx noted the horrendous conditions of factories in 19th-century

England, he was quick to point out that capitalism in its early stage represented

a progressive and favorable historical change. In contrast, the

fourth industrial revolution, for all its attractive features (Google Maps,

movie streaming, etc.), is a horror show, as described by Robinson.

High up on this list is the police state, which Robinson discussed in

his previous book The Global Police State,1 and which the COVID pandemic

strengthened. In a dynamic that paralleled events after September

11, 2001, the pandemic served to justify the abridgement of

democratic rights, including “draconian ‘antiterrorist’ security legislation”

in 14 countries “that often made legal the repression of social

movements and political dissent” (41). As in the case of the Patriot

Act, these measures are unlikely to be temporary and may serve as a

“smokescreen to consolidate a global police state” (50). The pandemic

encouraged the development of increasingly sophisticated methods of

surveillance (as analyzed in The Age of Surveillance Capitalism by

Shoshana Zuboff)2 through the use of digital technology to “surveil

the movement of potentially infected individuals” (46). The new

wave of digitalization accelerated by the pandemic has also led to

the use of “autonomous weaponry, such as unmanned attack and

transportation vehicles, robot soldiers, [and] a new generation of

superdrones” (79), as well as “predictive policing,” a practice which

discriminates against vulnerable sectors. These methods of enhanced

state control are just a few examples of the three-fold convergence

that the book documents: the “advanced digitalization” (54) of the

fourth industrial revolution, the COVID pandemic, and despotism

and the departure from traditional norms and practices.

Robinson has long argued that transnational capital (TNC) has

replaced national capital as the dominant force in the age of globalization.

His Marxist critics claim that his thesis is at odds with the existence

of a strong nation-state such as that represented by Washington

and even with the concept of imperialism according to Lenin, which

is territorially based. According to them, the existence of an imperialist

state that defends national capital, and is as powerful as Washington is,

precludes the possibility that the TNC has become hegemonic. Robinson

responded by pointing to the emergence of a Transnational State

(TNS), as exemplified by the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).3 More

importantly, Robinson argued that the nation-states, and that of the

United States in particular, represented the interests of the TNC

more than those of national capital. Under Trump, however, the TPP

was scrapped, at the same time that the polarization of Cold War II

sharpened conflict over national interests.

 

In this book, Robinson answers his critics with a nuanced, and in

my opinion more convincing, explanation of the coexistence of a hegemonic

TNC and a hegemonic nation-state. Along the lines of the theory

of the state formulated by Nicos Poulantzas,4 Robinson discards the

notion that the state is a mere instrument of the hegemonic class fraction,

in this case the TNC, and argues that the legitimizing function of

the state enters into contradiction with the capital accumulation

imperative of the TNC. Robinson adds that “geopolitical frictions”

such as those involving Russia and China, “are used to justify rising

military budgets” (51) and in the process foster “militarized accumulation”

(25). Indeed, the legitimizing function can plainly be seen in

the case of the war mongering of Democratic Party centrists and Republicans

that, at least until now, has resonated among many voters and

thus serves to bolster legitimacy. In short, the legitimizing function

has a dynamic of its own which at times “overdetermine[s] economics”

(52), specifically the maximization of profits of big capital. Robinson

adds that “we can expect the contradictions” between the two functions

“to intensify in the post-pandemic world” (53).

 

Robinson clearly considers the fourth industrial revolution a phase

in capitalism and calls the changes that the Covid pandemic accelerated

“capitalist restructuring” (90). Indeed, his characterization of the

fourth industrial revolution as an example of the internal transformation

of the capitalist system is derived from Marx and Engels. Both

famously observed in The Communist Manifesto that “the bourgeoisie

cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production,

and thereby the relations of production, and with them the

whole relations of society.”

 

Robinson stops short of engaging those theoreticians, across the

political spectrum, who argue that the salient features of the fourth

industrial revolution resemble feudalism rather than representing a

new stage of capitalism. These “neo-feudalism” (or “techno-feudalism”)

writers, who include the Greek Marxist economist Yanis Varoufakis,

argue that what Robinson calls “capitalist restructuring”

represents a break with the capitalist system. Varoufakis calls the

new system a “post-capitalist dystopia” that is “worse than capitalism.”

5 The neo-feudalism writers maintain that digital platforms,

accumulation by dispossession, the predominance of fictious capital,

prison labor in privatized prisons, central banks’ massive printing of

money that replaces profits as the driver of the global economy and

other developments largely discussed by Robinson do not involve production

that generates surplus value, which is a basic component of

capitalism. Furthermore, these modes do not involve “free” labor

markets, which are also specific to the capitalist system. Yet a deviation

from pure capitalism does not signify a complete break with the

system. As David Laibman observed in Passion and Patience: Society,

History, and Revolutionary Vision, regardless of how an economic

system is defined (be it slavery, feudalism, capitalism or socialism),

seldom in history has it existed in its pure form in a given country or

region.

 

In the chapter “Whither the Global Revolt?” Robinson analyzes

resistance to neoliberalism in the twenty-first century through a globalization

lens. He looks at the popular insurgencies that broke out in two

waves following the 2008 crash, which he calls a “veritable tsunami of

mass rebellion not seen since at least 1968” (102). One began with the

“Arab Spring” and included the Occupy Wall Street movement and

the protests in Spain and Greece led by Podemos and Syriza, and a

second between 2017 and 2019, which included protests throughout

Latin America as well as the “yellow vest” movement in France. Robinson

contends that the protests were driven by what the Financial Times

called a “‘global mood’” (103) and “had a truly global character” (102).

Actually, the dynamic in which events in one country have a ripple or

“demonstration” effect throughout the region or the world has been a

constant throughout history. For Robinson to demonstrate the unique

qualities of the post-2008 “global revolt” he would have to show that

there were solid organizational links among protest movements

throughout the world. Such links existed, but as Robinson recognizes,

as in the case of the World Social Forum, they were tenuous and hardly

a driver of the “global revolt.”

 

Robinson goes on to point to the limited effectiveness of the Black

Lives Movement and other anti-racist protests in 2020 in that they were

“devoid of any critique of capitalist exploitation that linked race to

class” (130), as is also generally the case with identity politics. These

movements have only been successful in “eradicating the symbols of

racism and oppression” and for this reason “they were quickly embraced

by many political and corporate elites” (131). To be effective, it is essential

that the social movements adhere to a class analysis and that they “be

part of amore expansive transnational counterhegemonic project, including

transnational trade unionism…and transnational political organizations

that put forth a transnational transformative project” (120).

 

While Robinson’s critique holds true, his analysis resembles the sharp criticisms

now common among leftists who fail to recognize the potential of

identity politics – even short of class analysis – to expose contradictions in

the capitalist system and the double standards of those who support it.

Since the publication of his first works about globalization over two

decades ago, Robinson has offered considerable evidence to substantiate

his theories about contemporary capitalism. This book is no exception.

The information it marshals about the innovations of the fourth industrial

revolution demonstrates their far-reaching implications, which

Robinson persuasively argues require a rethinking of theoretical analysis

and strategy. Most importantly, the book shatters the illusion that the

new wave of technological innovations in a capitalist context represents

something other than a threat to civilization as we know it.

 

ORCID

Steve Ellner http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9969-3350

© 2025 Steve Ellner

Ukraine's Endless, Senseless War: Trump Finally Says Something that Makes Sense

I never thought I would wholeheartedly support something Trump says and does. But this is an exception. He posted this on Social Truth:

 

"Think of it, a modestly successful comedian, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, talked the United States of America into spending $350 Billion Dollars, to go into a War that couldn't be won, that never had to start, but a War that he, without the U.S. and "TRUMP," will never be able to settle. The United States has spent $200 Billion Dollars more than Europe, and Europe's money is guaranteed, while the United States will get nothing back. Why didn't Sleepy Joe Biden demand Equalization, in that this War is far more important to Europe than it is to us - We have a big, beautiful Ocean as separation. On top of this, Zelenskyy admits that half of the money we sent him is "MISSING." He refuses to have Elections, is very low in Ukrainian Polls, and the only thing he was good at was playing Biden "like a fiddle." A Dictator without Elections, Zelenskyy better move fast or he is not going to have a Country left. In the meantime, we are successfully negotiating an end to the War with Russia, something all admit only "TRUMP," and the Trump Administration, can do. Biden never tried, Europe has failed to bring Peace, and Zelenskyy probably wants to keep the "gravy train" going. I love Ukraine, but Zelenskyy has done a terrible job, his Country is shattered, and MILLIONS have unnecessarily died – And so it continues….."

 

TRUMP IS POLITICIZING THE SUPER BOWL, AS HE DOES EVERYTHING ELSE

I wouldn’t criticize the President for attending the Super Bowl, but in my opinion he shouldn’t have publicly stated that he’ll be rooting for Kansas City, and specifically its quarterback. For Kansas fans who are vehemently opposed to Trump, it detracts from the thrill of watching the game. 

Though my intention is not to compare the two, Hitler did something similar when he went all out and, along with all of Germany, sided with Max Schmeling in the heavy weight championship bout in 1938. And look what happened to Schmeling. The lesson: Politicians should stay away from sporting events. Long live Joe Louis! Long live Jesse Owens.  

 

How Ludicrous is Trump’s Threat to Send Troops into Panama?

 

The following link is to an article of mine posted by Jacobin yesterday:

https://jacobin.com/2025/01/trump-latin-america-china-trade

Trump's threats to take over the Panama Canal, convert Canada into the 51st state, and purchase Greenland may not be as ludicrous as they seemed. The proposals, albeit unachievable, lay the groundwork for a more "rational" strategy of targeting China (not so much Russia) and singling out real adversaries (as opposed to Canada and Panama), which include Cuba and Venezuela, with Bolivia not far behind. 

The main thesis in the article is that the “intelligent” members of Trump’s administration, namely the neo-cons and other right-wingers (Marco Rubio, for example) will end up dictating U.S. foreign policy. But there is another factor, namely, that as a right-wing populist Trump is playing to his base. His threats to send troops into Panama and Greenland are bold moves. That’s what his base gets off on. Invading Cuba and Venezuela, or threatening to do so, is too old stuff to rile up his base. In addition, the possibility of getting concessions from Panama, Denmark and Canada over trade, shipping costs, etc. would also work to his political advantage. In that case he would boast of how he put to practice “The Art of the Deal” which would provide him with much-needed political capital.

Another Example of How the U.S. Military Industrial Complex Eclipses Human Needs

 

The Center for American Progress, hardly a leftist think tank, wrote “Even as Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy [both billionaires] talk about cutting trillions in Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, they have been silent about efficient defense spending.” The report went on to state that up until now, Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency has failed to insist that the Department of Defense pass an audit.