López Obrador’s Moment
Article posted by
NACLA: Report on the Americas on July 3, 2018
Lede: It took Andrés
Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) 12 years to become president-elect of Mexico,
making history for Mexico’s Left as his party’s coalition also achieves a
legislative majority. But the struggle has just begun.
by Steve Ellner
Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s sweeping victory
in Mexico’s July 1 general elections came as no surprise, but the absolute
majority won by his MORENA party and its allies in the congressional contests
was hardly a foregone conclusion. López Obrador (or AMLO as he is known) pulled
in 53 percent of the popular vote.[1] The candidates for the two parties that have governed
Mexico over the recent past, the Partido
Acción Nacional (PAN) and the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), received 23 and
16 percent respectively. AMLO’s win on Sunday contrasts with his
presidential bids in 2006 and 2012 when his competitors barely eked out dubious
wins over him.
Shortly after midnight on July 2, AMLO
delivered a victory speech that made clear his number
one priority would be combating poverty: “For the benefit of everyone,
the poor come first,” he declared.[2]
At the same time, he suggested that his government would avoid clashes with
economic and possibly political elites. Along these lines, he recognized the
“professionalism” exhibited by the communications media during the 2018 electoral
campaign, which he contrasted with what he called the media’s “transmissions
for a dirty war” during the two previous elections. Similarly, he contrasted
Peña Nieto’s democratic behavior in the 2018 elections with that of the
national executive in past electoral contests.
AMLO’s cordial words for his adversaries on July 2 have two
readings. On the one hand, they reflect his more moderate tone, particularly displayed
in the latter months of the campaign. On the other, his complimentary remarks
about the media and Peña Nieto may reflect the fact that elite groups put up
less resistance to his candidacy this time around precisely because they
perceived that he represents less of a threat to their interests.
Sunday’s results also reflect the crescendo of discontent
during the current presidency of Enrique Peña Nieto and toward Mexico’s
political status quo represented by both PRI and PAN. Various scandals have
exposed Peña Nieto’s unethical behavior and deficient leadership, as the nation
has experienced a surge in violence and a sluggish economy. Between January
2015 and March 2018 homicide
rates nearly doubled. The sharp increase in the imports of such an
emblematic product as corn over the last two decades is a graphic indication of
the nation’s economic ills, as well as the downside of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for Mexico.
The results of the congressional elections are particularly
important in predicting AMLO’s governance strategies going forward. Many elites
have feared that an AMLO presidency would impose top-down revolutionary change.
During the campaign, AMLO attempted to assuage these concerns by pledging to obtain
majority legislative approval for all major decisions at the same time that he
ruled out governing by decree. After two
thwarted bids for the presidency and given the young age of his party, it
seemed unlikely that MORENA could take control of both chambers of congress.
They were wrong.
By the latter months of the campaign, the groundswell of
support for AMLO’s candidacy began to indicate that MORENA had a real shot at
winning a majority in congress. The reaction of capital was panicked and predictable.
In May, Mexico's benchmark stock index plummeted 7.6
percent, representing the biggest monthly decline in nearly a decade. As Jorge
Mariscal of Switzerland-based UBS Wealth Management explained
to NBC, “there was an expectation that he would
win, but that he would have a check from other parties in congress.”
With such concerns undoubtedly in mind, on June 5, AMLO met
behind closed doors with top businesspeople in an attempt to—in his words—“smooth
over differences.” [1]
Attendees included billionaire Germán Larrea, the CEO of Mexico’s largest
mining company “Grupo Mexico,” who had called on employees to vote against the
“populist” candidate, claiming that if he won, their jobs would be in danger. A
union spokesman of the famed Cananea mines in northern Mexico lashed out at Larrea
for his “threatening
stance” and called on the electoral commission to investigate the
intimidation which violates the nation’s constitution. The extended list of
Mexico’s leading capitalists who question AMLO’s democratic credentials
includes Carlos Slim, the world’s seventh richest person, according to Forbes. AMLO
described the meeting as “constructive.”
During the campaign, AMLO appointed some figures from
outside MORENA’s main cadre as leading advisors in specific areas of policy
making, as part of an effort to win over or neutralize members of the business
community, at least for the time being. It seems to have succeeded. In an
attempt to define vague aspects of AMLO’s program particularly in the area of
economic policy, these spokespeople formulated positions that were more
moderate than what AMLO had previously embraced.
One key advisor and coordinator of AMLO’s governing program was
the agro-industrialist Alfonso Romo, who is now slated to be the
president-elect’s cabinet chief. Romo formerly had ties with Opus Dei and supported
PRI and PAN governments. Romo assured that AMLO was receptive to the critical positions
of the non-MORENA advisors, adding, “we are all
changing, and are all learning.” Romo referred specifically to two
polemical issues: AMLO’s previous pledges to reverse the privatization of the
oil industry and to halt construction of Mexico City’s $13 billion airport, which
he considered a waste of resources. But advisors like Romo left open the
possibility that as president AMLO would build on both Peña Nieto initiatives,
rather than rescind them. In both cases, the administration would thoroughly
examine existing contracts to root out corruption. But, as Romo
said, “if there is no stain of corruption, the bidding process will
continue.” In response, the famed leftist writer and fervent MORENA militant Paco Ignacio Taibo II pointed out that Romo’s position conflicted
with the party’s stance on privatization, and asked: “In whose name is Romo
speaking?”
Similarly,
AMLO chose Alfonso Durazo, who had previously served in both PRI and PAN
governments, to head the area of citizen security. During his campaign, AMLO
proposed to grant amnesty to those outside of the law if they promised to avoid
future criminal activity. Durazo ruled out blanket amnesty for violent crimes,
and assured that key decisions would only be made on the basis of congressional
approval and a national debate. He also pointed out that an AMLO government
would honor Mexico’s obligations regarding crimes such as kidnapping, acquired
as a result of international treaties. Finally, Durazo promised that all measures
along these lines would involve consultation from the relatives of victims of
drug violence. Durazo’s qualifications might come into conflict with
alternative efforts to reduce crime and violence—AMLO recently expressed his
approval for a Catholic bishop’s initiative to negotiate with drug kingpins in Guerrero
in order to reduce violence.
AMLO’s amnesty proposal was a logical response to failed
militarized efforts to combat violence associated with drug activity in Mexico.
The administration of Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) launched the country’s drug
war, helped along with U.S. funding as part of a program known as the Mérida
Initiative beginning in 2007. The Initiative increased funding and equipment
for Mexican armed forces and police, and involved bringing Mexican military
forces into everyday policing operations. This led to increases in human rights
abuses and violence by the armed forces as well as by the drug cartels, as its
membership splintered, vied for power, and diversified their income streams. AMLO
has advocated a reorientation of government efforts toward focusing more on
domestic crime and less on international drug trafficking. His central argument
is that the virtual state of civil war in various regions of the country warrants
a drastic change in strategy.
Foreign policy is the area where a break with the recent
past seems most certain. AMLO’s future Secretary of Foreign Relations, Héctor Vasconcelos
(son of José Vasconcelos, an iconic figure of the Mexican Revolution) has promised
to uphold “the historic principles of Mexico’s foreign policy,” meaning it
will maintain normal relations with nations that Washington attempts to
isolate. Over the last two decades, the Mexican government has abandoned that policy,
first with regard to Cuba and more recently Venezuela. Vasconcelos also
suggests that Mexico reconsider the participation of Mexican soldiers in UN-sponsored peacekeeping
missions, an activity which Peña Nieto expanded in order to—according to political
scientist Rafael de la Garza Talavera—“reinforce his image as a winner among
fellow countrymen and international public opinion.”
When it comes to Venezuela, even while Valsconcelos pledges
not to criticize that nation’s “internal matters,” AMLO has called for the liberation
of opposition leader Leopoldo López. Even so, AMLO’s foreign policy has the
Washington establishment and its allies worried. Miami Herald columnist Andrés
Openheimer has expressed concern that AMLO’s foreign policy will signify a
setback for Venezuelan democracy as the Lima Group, which serves as a forum to
condemn the Venezuelan government, will possibly lose “one of its biggest and
most active members.”
During the 2018 presidential campaign, AMLO softened his criticism
of NAFTA.[3] In
June, AMLO joined the two other main presidential candidates along with Peña
Nieto in rejecting Trump’s threat to negotiate separate treaties with Canada
and Mexico as well as the tariffs Washington placed on steel and aluminum
imports. Nevertheless, his position on NAFTA remains critical. AMLO has stated that
he prefers to leave NAFTA rather than accept a worse deal,[4]
but in any case he stands by the idea that the government should stimulate national
production to reduce its dependence on U.S. products[5].
He has also suggested that his government would include the issues of
immigration and the construction of a border wall in the negotiations over
NAFTA.
Some Mexican leftists have criticized AMLO, MORENA and its
predecessor party for having watered down or abandoned previous leftist positions.
According to the leftist critique, in the 1980s, when a group led by Cuauhtémoc
Cárdenas split from the PRI and eventually created the left-wing Partido de la
Revolución Democrática (PRD), it absorbed a spectrum of left organizations as
well as former communists and socialists. In the process, it deprived the
nation of an anti-system point of reference, in effect, signifying the death of
the left in Mexico. AMLO led the PRD until he left the party to found MORENA
after a series of corruption scandals tainted the organization. The far-left,
such as the Trotskyist party Izquierda Revolucionaria (IR), has criticized
MORENA for its alliances with less militant organizations and individuals “subordinating
all of the party’s actions to electoral campaigns.”[2] Nevertheless,
the IR calls on its members to work within MORENA and provide AMLO critical
support.
Most MORENA militants who consider themselves on the left support
AMLO despite reservations, as I
wrote in NACLA’s summer issue this year. Jorge Veraza, a foremost Mexican
scholar of Marxism, told me, “members of MORENA’s leftist current generally
feel that López Obrador’s time to govern has come; they hail his courage for
having rejected the efforts of PRI and PAN to create a ‘national consensus’ as
a cover for advancing a neoliberal agenda.”
The conservative ascendancy throughout the world and the
setbacks suffered by Pink Tide governments in the region have undoubtedly
influenced AMLO to tone down his rhetoric and modify stands in order to become
a viable candidate in Mexico. It is precisely for this reason that the
significance of AMLO’s triumph cannot be underestimated as it contrasts so
markedly with electoral trends elsewhere. Although AMLO is unlikely to undo the
neoliberal reforms that found maximum expression in the Peña Nieto administration,
his proposals point to potentially far-reaching changes. For instance, the
annulment of contracts with multinational oil firms (or construction companies
working on the Mexico City airport) that violate national legislation and interests
or contain elements of fraud clashes with what neoliberal apologists consider
to be the sacred rights of private capital. Furthermore, AMLO’s refusal to endorse
the international condemnation of the governments of Venezuela and Cuba goes a
long way toward discrediting the interventionism promoted by the Trump
administration. AMLO’s amnesty proposal and support for scaling back or
eliminating the Mérida Initiative also represent an assertion of national
sovereignty which distances Mexico from the colossus to the north.
While some leftists pejoratively characterize AMLO as a
“social democrat” or “center-leftist,” those on the opposite side of the
political spectrum consider his program to be obsolete. Former leftist Jorge
Castañeda, a campaign coordinator for presidential candidate Ricardo Anaya,
has critiqued AMLO because “López Obrador believes in outdated nationalism,
outdated statism, archaic protectionism and archaic subsidies in all spheres.” Nevertheless,
context is everything. Since the fall of the right-wing dictatorships in South
America in the 1980s, no particular economic model has proved successful in the
region. In a world dominated by neoliberals and right wingers, AMLO’s election
provides hope and opportunities for progressives in Mexico and elsewhere.
At the same time, AMLO’s effort to convince powerful elite interests
that he does not represent a systemic threat faces limits. As we’ve seen in
Brazil and other Pink Tide governments, many of those who defend the
established order will promote destabilization and regime change as soon as leftist
governments confront serious economic difficulties and an erosion of political
support. The only effective response is mobilization of the popular sectors,
which a government that reneges on promises of popular and nationalistic reform
and change will not be able to count on.
The majority vote achieved by AMLO and the MORENA coalition on
July 1 will facilitate actions in favor of much needed change for Mexico. The
pro-establishment discourse, however, now points out that Mexico’s federal
system requires a majority at the state level – which the MORENA coalition lacks
—to be able to enact far-reaching legislation. Congressional control will
certainly help, but will not guarantee that AMLO can fulfill the expectations
he’s built for the Mexicans who put their faith in him on July 1.
Steve Ellner has been
a NACLA contributor since the late 1980s. His most recent article,
“Implications of Marxist State Theory and How They Play Out in Venezuela”
appeared in the journal Historical Materialism. He is the editor of the Latin American Perspectives issue “Latin America’s Progressive
Governments: Separating Socio-Economic Breakthroughs and Shortcomings,” slated
for January 2019.
[1]
https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/Morena-gana-la-Presidencia-y-la-mayoria-en-el-Congreso-20180702-0086.html
[3]
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-election-result/mexicos-lopez-obrador-commits-to-nafta-after-landslide-win-idUSKBN1JS0R3
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