Attacks on Maduro Coming from the Left: Criticism is One Thing, Satanization is Another

By Steve Ellner

One of the most important debates on the left over the past century has centered on how to assess governments committed to socialism which, when confronted with imperialist aggression, veer from their original course.[1] Cases in point include the Soviet Union under Stalin and after 1953, Cuba under Fidel, Vietnam following the death of Ho Chi Minh, China under Mao Zedong and in the present, and Venezuela under the presidency of Nicolas Maduro.[2] The exchanges on the pages of Links between Gabriel Hetland, Emiliano Teran Mantovani, and myself over the Maduro government must be seen in this wider historical context.

In his latest rejoinder, Hetland does a good job in summarizing areas of agreement and differences between us, making any further recap unnecessary. This article will only examine gaps, four in particular.

First, the Left worldwide needs to center its attention on the struggle against U.S. imperialism, and quite possibly characterize it as its number one current priority. Consider the U.S.'s omnipotent role in combating progressive movements around the world, the devastation it has unleashed in Gaza and across the Middle East, and its military budget that fuels arms races and heightens the risk of a nuclear confrontation. Just one example is its construction of the Golden Dome missile defense system and the Pentagon's program for the massive production of drones. The aim is to force China to keep pace militarily thereby straining its economy. The Reagan administration pursued the same strategy in the 1980s, which the Right credits with hastening the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Mao’s dictum on the importance of determining the principal contradiction at any given moment – defined during the Japanese occupation of China as imperialism – is applicable to Venezuela. Its economy is dependent on petroleum to the extent that it’s hard to imagine any leftist government escaping the devastating impact of the US-imposed sanctions. Considering Washington’s relentless regime-change actions, imperialism must be seen as the principal contradiction confronting Venezuela. Yet in his discussion of what he calls “by far” “the most important criterion” for evaluating the Maduro government, Hetland indicates – at least implicitly – that he does not share this view on the imperative to prioritize the anti-imperialist struggle.

Venezuela and Cuba have to be seen as the front line of defense against U.S. imperialism in Latin America. What is at stake is the prospect of total subjugation – hinted at by Trump and his neocon supporters when they invoke the Monroe Doctrine, which they view as essential to safeguarding U.S. national security. Moreover, U.S. intervention has given rise to failed states and prolonged civil wars in countries like Haiti, Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Whether this depiction is relevant to the debate over the Maduro government is a valid question that merits inclusion in the discussion presented in the articles published by Links.   

Second, nowhere in the two articles by Hetland is there any discussion of what I identify as positive or progressive aspects of the Maduro government (foreign policy, communes, community participation). His only comment along these lines is the following: “Maduro’s foreign policy continues to exhibit traces of anti-imperialism, but even this is highly limited.” Hetland, however, offers no explanation as to why he considers the progressiveness of Maduro’s foreign policy to be “highly limited.”

The failure to address these issues is a fundamental shortcoming because my articles in Links on the Maduro government do not deny important downsides but rather address the negative consequences and inaccuracies of the demonization of Maduro. My basic argument against Hetland and Teran (as well as the Communists Party of Venezuela  [(PCV)] article authored by Pedro Eusee[3]) is that their demonization of Maduro is counterproductive from a progressive viewpoint because it undermines the work of the Venezuelan solidarity movement in opposition to the sanctions. The issue at stake is not about mistaken policies but rather demonization. The recognition of important positive aspects runs counter to the demonization that permeates all four articles in Links. 

Following from the premise that anti-imperialism needs to be prioritized, the largely progressive nature of Venezuela’s foreign policy has to be brought into the picture in a major way, which none of the four articles do. The details matter, especially when they go beyond mere rhetoric. Examples include Venezuela’s solidarity toward Cuba in the form of shipment of much-needed oil on generous terms, despite the logistical difficulties imposed by the U.S. sanctions. Furthermore, in the context of Latin America’s increasing political polarization, Venezuela has been in the forefront of clashes with right-wing governments including those of Argentina’s Javier Milei, Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, Ecuador’s Daniel Noboa and Panama’s José Raúl Mulino. Moreover, Maduro’s actions have stood in solidarity with Venezuelan immigrants in the United States, at the same time that he has lashed out at Washington’s inhumane policies toward them. Also significant is that the Venezuelan government hosted the World Congress against Fascism last year, drawing 500 activists from 95 countries, and has vehemently defended the Palestinian cause.   

Third, open debate, transparency and the free flow of information are the first that get sacrificed when a nation is in a wartime-like situation. Such an environment has been thrust on Venezuela beginning in 2014-2015, with the four months of regime change street actions (known as the “guarimba”) and the Obama executive order declaring the nation a threat to U.S. national security. The resultant “grey areas” pose a dilemma for analysts lacking inside information in that they complicate the task of reaching well-founded conclusions. Numerous examples can be cited. One is the cash transactions for petroleum on the high seas (known as “cash and carry”) to avoid secondary sanctions against buyers and shipping companies, a practice conducive to corruption. Another is the strengthening of the military faction within Chavismo (which dates back to the beginning of the Chávez presidency, if not earlier) as a result of Washington’s open calls on military officers to overthrow the government. The unity of the two main longstanding currents within Chavismo, led by Maduro and former military lieutenant Diosdado Cabello, was a sine qua non for the survival of the Maduro government from the very outset.[4] This reality may have limited Maduro’s options.

The existence of these grey areas does not rule out the possible condemnation in absolute terms of a president of a given nation. They do, however, underscore the need to recognize that Venezuela, under the Maduro government, represents an extreme case of a nation facing ongoing imperialist aggression and to give serious consideration to the resultant challenges. The existence of important grey areas also suggests that a nuanced analysis regarding the complexity of the Venezuelan case is more appropriate than the black and white one put forward by those who demonize Maduro.

Fourth, in the section of his article titled "Solidarity," Hetland points out that the anti-war movement mobilized against the Iraq War even while stopping short of defending the Saddam Hussein regime. Hetland concludes that by the same logic, there is no reason why the Venezuelan solidarity movement needs to highlight anything positive about the Maduro government. The example of the Iraq War, however, is compelling precisely because it demonstrates the opposite. The reprehensible image of Hussein contributed to the disappointing mobilization capacity (after an initial spurt) of the anti-war movement during those years, in sharp contrast to the massive protests against the Vietnam War in the 1960s. One reason (although undoubtedly not the main one) was that large numbers of those who protested in the 60s were inspired by the tremendous prestige that Ho Chi Minh enjoyed at the time.

Moreover, one of the most important and effective activities of the Cuban and Venezuelan solidarity movements has been organizing trips to both countries, (as the movement against the Vietnam War also famously undertook.) One may ask: Would an organization that demonizes the Maduro government be likely to sponsor delegations of activists and sympathizers to Venezuela?

Finally, Hetland's comparison between the Iraq War and the international sanctions against Venezuela falls short, since anti-war movements (such as in the case of Iraq) and solidarity movements (as with Venezuela) focus on different issues, as I discussed in my previous rejoinder. The effectiveness of international solidarity movements, more than the anti-war movement, largely hinges on the positive image of the government that is being targeted by imperialism.

In closing, I would like to bring into the discussion Domenico Losurdo’s Western Marxism: How it Died, How it can be Reborn[5], which recently has been the source of considerable discussion and debate on the left. Losurdo contends that historically much of the Left (those he calls “Western Marxists”) has failed to grasp the anti-imperialist nature of socialist governments. Elsewhere, I have criticized Losurdo for casting too wide a net in placing individual leftists in the pejorative category of “Western Marxism.”  On the positive side, however, Losurdo’s book skillfully articulates what the experience of socialist governments have clearly demonstrated over the last century: socialist construction in countries of the South, in a world in which capitalism is hegemonic and imperialism predominates, is a far more complex process than the struggle to achieve state power. Even more so in the case of Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Maduro, which has been singled out by Washington for special attack, a fact that has been thoroughly documented.[6]

Losurdo contends that only leftist purists (who he calls “Western Marxists”) deny the role played by private capital in socialist transition. None of the four articles posted in Links recognize the complexity involved in the economic transformation of a nation like Venezuela committed to socialism, and specifically the thorny issue of its relations with tactical allies in the private sector, which beyond doubt open the door to corruption.

Hetland notes that Chávez (and Maduro) “was unable to overcome Venezuela’s longstanding hyper dependence on oil,” while the PCV’s Pedro Eusse asserts that the Chavista government left the “rentier” model intact. While both statements are accurate, the authors fail to provide the reader with the outline of a viable economic strategy, taking into consideration current circumstances. Indeed, there are no ready-made blueprints or panaceas to deal with the types of challenges that the Maduro government has faced on the economic front since 2015, when Washington escalated its war on Venezuela and options became limited. Any realistic analysis that offers solutions to the pressing economic problems confronting post-2015 Venezuela will inevitably be at odds with the black and white line of reasoning that demonizes Maduro and equates his government with the right-wing opposition.

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[1] I would like to thank Leonardo Flores and Lucas Koerner for their critical comments on this article as well as the previous one posted by Links.

[2] On what basis do I assert that Maduro is committed to socialism? Maduro’s personal and political trajectory is relevant. His background is not that of a social democrat-type politician. Born into a leftist family, Maduro was an activist and member of radical left parties in his youth, before joining the Chavista movement in the 1990s. For six years he served as the foreign minister under Chávez, who few would deny was a socialist. Maduro heads the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) party, which officially adheres to scientific socialism and Marxism.

[3] Work on this article was well under way before Links posted the Eusse-PCV article. With regard to the PCV’s critique of, and split with, the Maduro government in 2020, I have argued elsewhere that both sides committed errors that contributed to the falling out. I would like to add that throughout my career as a writer and analyst, I have written extensively on the PCV’s history (beginning with my Ph.D. dissertation) and have highlighted its heroic struggles. In the process, I interviewed, got to know, and developed great admiration for numerous PCV historical leaders. Ellner, “Objective Conditions in Venezuela: Maduro’s Defensive Strategy and Contradictions among the People.” Science & Society (July 2023), p. 401-402.

[4] When Chávez died in 2013, there was considerable speculation that Maduro and Cabello would come into conflict over control of the Chavista movement. Maduro, who in the early years of the Chávez presidency headed the Chavista labor movement fraction in Congress, was associated with worker demands and leftist ideology, unlike Cabello. Ellner and Fred Rosen, “Chavismo at the crossroads: Hardliners, moderates and a regime under attack.” NACLA: Report on the Americas (May-June, 2002), pp. 9-11.

 

[5] Losurdo, Western Marxism: How it Died, How it can be Reborn (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2024).

 

[6] Joe Emersberger and Justin Podur, Extraordinary Threat: The U.S. Empire, the Media, and Twenty Years of Coup Attempts in Venezuela (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2021), pp. 21-23; Ellner, “Objective Conditions in Venezuela…,” pp. 396-399.

 

 Source: LINKS

Steve Ellner is an Associate Managing Editor of Latin American Perspectives and a retired professor of the Universidad de Oriente in Venezuela. His latest books include his edited Latin American Extractivism: Dependency, Resource Nationalism and Resistance in Broad Perspective (2021) and his co-edited Latin American Social Movements and Progressive Governments: Creative Tensions Between Resistance and Convergence (2022).

https://links.org.au/solidarity-venezuela-real-issue-demonisation-not-criticism-maduro