Saturday, September 25, 2021

Upcoming Elections in Nicaragua and Washington’s Alleged Neutrality

Analyses of Nicaraguan events - with a presidential election slated for November 7 - cannot minimize the importance of U.S intervention. Indeed, Washington's role in promoting regime change has to be in the center of any serious discussion of the topic. John Bolton's claim, for instance, that Nicaragua belonged to the Axis of Evil made in November 2018 injected a big dose of adrenaline in the veins of the opposition, and for good reason: it signaled an escalation of Washington's commitment to oust Daniel Ortega by any means possible.

The November issue of “Latin American Perspectives” features a symposium on Nicaragua with one main article along with nearly a dozen Comments. The Comments by Dan Kovalik – long- time activist and analyst of the Second Cold War - and myself criticize the main article which denies that US intervention is playing a major role and emphasizes convergences between the Sandinista government and Washington. The following is my symposium Comment.

 

Héctor Cruz-Feliciano [in his “Whither Nicaragua Three Years On?”] presents hard evidence to refute accounts that minimize the repressiveness of government actions and the number of casualties resulting from the protests beginning in April 2018. What he does not deal with is the considerable evidence that the protests had a dual character. While young idealists protested pacifically, a second component consisting of violent and in some cases paid protesters was responsible for at least 10 police deaths and gruesome harm inflicted on Sandinista supporters. If this account is accurate, then the protests resembled the Venezuelan guarimbas of 2014 and 2017, partly spearheaded by the right-wing Voluntad Popular party, more than the popular mobilizations against Latin American neoliberal governments in 2019–2020. Cruz-Feliciano underestimates the magnitude of U.S. opposition to the Ortega government. He claims that the NICA Act of 2018, which blocks loans from multilateral financial institutions, was a mere electoral ploy with no intention to “asphyxiate” Nicaragua. He offers no proof regarding the limited effects of the act, which was implemented at a time of serious economic difficulty. He attributes the allegedly bland reaction from Washington to Ortega’s probusiness strategy, including agreements with the IMF. But policy makers are not a monolithic group. Neocons among others are more concerned with geopolitics than with economics. Certainly Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, Bob Menendez, and Eliot Engel, who were among the main drivers of the NICA Act in Congress, are not known for their restraint in dealings with countries considered to be U.S. adversaries. Cruz-Feliciano recognizes the major role played by China (which was to finance the interoceanic canal) and Venezuela, which in itself was enough to earn the enmity of influential sectors in Washington. 


In his attempt to play down U.S. support for the protests, Cruz-Feliciano claims that “a causal relationship has yet to be established between the [democracy-promotion] money and the protests themselves.” Direct relationships, however, usually do not exist in these cases, but influence is undeniable. He then states that NED and USAID funding for Nicaraguan groups is “often significantly less” than elsewhere but fails to provide statistics. Pro-Sandinistas have attempted to document tens of millions of dollars channeled from abroad to Nicaraguan foundations, nongovernmental organizations, and media groups that have been combating the Sandinistas since their return to power. In another attempt to play down the Ortega government’s leftist credentials, Cruz-Feliciano points out that apart from their votes in favor of Nicaragua at the UN, China, Venezuela, and Russia have refrained from carrying out “compelling action in defense of Ortega and Murillo” in the face of U.S. sanctions. He fails to indicate what he means by “compelling action.” Certainly, political support within international institutions cannot be dismissed as insignificant. 


Cruz-Feliciano ends by pointing out that the youth protesters have greater moral standing than the pro- and anti-Sandinista politicians. He concludes: “In time, I venture to say, April 19 is likely to be known as the door leading to a new era of progressive change.” This upbeat forecast, however, ignores past experiences from the Arab Spring to the social protests in Latin America in the democratic transition period of the 1980s. In both cases the upshot was far different from what Cruz-Feliciano hopes for, as pro-elite organized groups and institutions and not social movements ended up on top. Predictions need to be based on realistic assessments, not wishful thinking. Indeed, the possibility that the fall of the Sandinista government may lead to a radical neoliberal government and terror unleashed against Ortega’s followers with the blessing of Washington cannot be dismissed.

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